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I. INTRODUCTION
As Sir Thomas More says in A Man for All Seasons, "[tihe law is not a
'light' for you or any man to see by; the law is not an instrument of any kind.
The law is a causeway upon which so long as he keeps to it a citizen may
walk safely."' An attorney is charged with helping "citizens" in the twists
and turns along this causeway and even helping them back to the causeway
when they have lost their direction. When an attorney fails in carrying out
his responsibilities, one remedy available to the injured "citizen" or person is
an action for legal malpractice.
IH. ELEMENTS OF A LEGAL MALPRACTICE ACTION
A legal malpractice plaintiff must plead and prove: (1) the attorney's
employment; (2) the attorney's neglect of a reasonable duty; and (3) the
negligence resulted in, and was the proximate cause of, loss to the plaintiff.
2
I. ROBERT BOLT, A MAN lOR Au. SEASONS, Act 11 (1960).
2. Steele v. Kehoe, 747 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 1999); Olmsted v. Emmanuel, 783 So. 2d
1122 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Home Furniture Depot, Inc. v. Entevor AB, 753 So. 2d
653 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000); Anderson v. Steven R. Andrews, P.A., 692 So. 2d 237
(Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Sure Snap Corp. v. Baena, 705 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1997); Bolves v. Hullinger, 629 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Chipman v.
Chonin, 597 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Riccio v. Stein, 559 So. 2d 1207 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Thompson v. Martin, 530 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988);
Maillard v. Dowdell, 528 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Hatcher v. Roberts, 478
So. 2d 1083 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Weiner v. Moreno, 271 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1973). See also Arky, Freed, Steams, Watson, Greer, Weaver, & Harris, P.A. v.
Bowmar Instrument Corp., 537 So. 2d 561, 563 (Fla. 1988) (holding litigants must state their
pleadings with sufficient particularity for the defense to be prepared).
2
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A. The Attorney's Employment
The first element of the cause of action, that an attorney must be
employed by the plaintiff/client, 3 is addressed in Ginsberg v. Chastain.4 The
issue before the court in Ginsberg was whether attorney Daniel Ginsberg's
one-time representation of Fred Chastain in a real estate matter entitled
Chastain to believe that Ginsberg was also representing him at a meeting
between Chastain and Annmarie Ahlers, one of Ginsberg's long-time
clients.5
Where the record is devoid of any evidence, which indicates that an
attorney-client relationship existed for legal services related to the particular
6
meeting at issue, the element is not proven. Chastain testified at trial that he
never discussed the subject of the meeting with Ginsberg, that he never
asked Ginsberg to perform any services in connection with drafting the
agreement between the parties, that Ginsberg never billed Chastain for any
services in connection with the agreement, that Chastain never requested a
bill, and that the parties had no fee agreement.7 Chastain thus failed to
establish employment of the attorney and had no cause of action for legal
malpractice.
Whether an attorney-client relationship existed in Giedzinski v. Palmer9
was deemed to be a factual issue resulting in a summary judgment being
reversed.' ° Palmer claimed that attorney Giedzinski breached his fiduciary
duty and confidential relationship to her when she purchased an interest in a
land trust from him." Giedzinski claimed he was not acting as Palmer's
attorney or as an attorney for the land trust when Palmer purchased her
3. Riccio v. Heitner, 559 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (holding law firm
estopped from denying the attorney client relationship existed due to failure to advise clients
that law firm had been dissolved while continuing to represent the clients).
4. 501 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
5. Id. at 28.
6. Accord Gutter v. Wunker, 631 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
(affirming dismissal for failure to allege attorney client relationship).
7. Ginsburg, 501 So. 2d at 29.
8. Id.
9. 595 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
10. Contra Voutsinas v. Stutin, 626 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(showing no facts to indicate attorneys ever agreed to handle the matter).
11. Giedzinski, 595 So. 2d at 295.
20021
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interest.12 Due to the disputed issues of fact, the case was "simply not a case
that lends itself to disposition via summary judgment."' 3
Even if an attorney-client relationship exists, the action complained of
must be within the scope of the attorney's initial employment. 14  The
aggrieved client in Atkin v. Tittle & Tittle 5 sued a lawyer for failing to
properly investigate zoning issues prior to the client purchasing an
unimproved lot. The trial court entered a directed verdict for the attorney,
overruling a jury verdict in favor of the former client.16 The Third District
Court of Appeal reinstated the jury verdict. 17
The Atkin trial court relied upon Maillard v. Dowdell18 in concluding
that the lawyer had "performed the duties for which he was employed,
investigated issues brought to his attention, and was not required to render
additional land use and zoning opinions for which he was not retained."' 9
This limited view of the attorney's duty was rejected by the appellate court
due to the expert testimony presented at trial and the language in the contract
regarding zoning issues.20 The court concluded:
Although Maillard provides the general rule as to an attorney's du-
ties when representing a client in a real estate transaction, that rule
is not absolute. An attorney may not disregard matters that arise
and reasonably signal potential legal problems although those mat-
ters may not fall precisely within the general rule.
21
1. Privity
A cause of action against an attorney for malpractice requires privity of
22contract unless excepted. The Supreme Court of Florida in Angel, Cohen
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Davis v. Hathaway, 408 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (reversing
summary judgment due to dispute in scope of attorneys services in the sale of a business).
15. 730 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 378.
18. 528 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
19. Atkin, 730 So. 2d at 377.
20. Id. at 377-78.
21. Id. at 378 (citing Maillard, 528 So. 2d at 515).
22. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Salter, 717 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
(holding insurance company could not sue attorneys for insured since they were not in privity
with attorneys or an intended third-party beneficiary).
[Vol. 27:85
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and Rogovin v. Oberon Inv., N. V.23 set forth the general controlling law as to
who may bring an action for legal malpractice. In Angel, the court stated,
"Florida courts have uniformly limited attorneys' liability for negligence in
the performance of their professional duties to clients with whom they share
privity of contract." 24
2. Third-Party Beneficiary Exception
The Angel court recognized that in Florida, the privity requirement had
been relaxed when "it was the apparent intent of the client to benefit a third
party.' '2s The area of will-drafting was cited as the most obvious example of
26this limited exception to the privity requirement. The First District Court
27
of Appeal in Greenberg v. Mahoney, Adams & Criser, P.A. understood the
Angel decision to encompass those situations where "it was the apparent
intent of the client to benefit the third party. 2 s The facts of the underlying
malpractice case in Greenberg are not set forth in the opinion. Therefore, no
guidance is provided as to what areas outside of the will-drafting arena may
overcome the privity requirement.29
In the case of Espinosa v. Sparber, Shevin, Shapo, Rosen and
Heilbronner,3 ° the court explained the "so-called will-drafting exception.'
The Third District Court of Appeal found that "[oInly where the testator's
intent as expressed in the will itself, not as shown by extrinsic evidence, is
frustrated due to the negligence of the testator's attorney-does the
frustrated beneficiary of the will have a legal malpractice action against the
testator' s lawyer.
' 32
23. 512 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 1987).
24. Id. at 194. See also Voutsinas v. Stutin, 626 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1993) (failing to establish employment); Nickolauson v. Rhyne, 529 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1988) (alleging privity sufficiently, details to be determined from the evidence).
25. Angel, 512 So. 2d at 194.
26. Id.; see also Lorraine v. Grover, Ciment, Weinstein & Stauber, P.A., 467 So. 2d
315 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985); DeMaris v. Asti, 426 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1983); McAbee v. Edwards, 340 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
27. 614 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
28. Id. at 605.
29. See id.
30. 586 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
31. Id. at 1223.
32. Id; accord Miami Beach Cmty. Church, Inc. v. Stanton, 611 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1992) ("[A] beneficiary of a will does not have a legal malpractice action
against the testator's lawyer unless the testator's intent as expressed in the will, not as shown
by extrinsic evidence, is frustrated due to the lawyer's negligence.") (citing Espinosa, 586 So.
20021
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Espinosa cited the following as an example of the privity exception:
[Wlhere (1) the testator makes a will leaving all her property to her
daughter and remarries thereafter, (2) hires a lawyer to make cer-
tain that her daughter remains the sole beneficiary under the will
after her remarriage, and is negligently assured by the lawyer that
no change was necessary to effect this intention, and (3) upon her
death, her husband takes a statutory share of her estate as a preter-
mitted husband-it has been held that the daughter has a legal mal-
practice action against the testator's lawyer; this is so because the
testamentary intent, as expressed in the will, to leave all her prop-
erty to her daughter was frustrated due to the lawyer's negligent
failure to draft a new will specifically excluding the testator's new
husband and again leaving all her property to the daughter. 
33
The court in Espinosa found that "[a]n attorney preparing a will has a
duty not only to the testator-client, but also to the testator's intended
beneficiaries, who may maintain a legal malpractice action against the
attorney on theories of either tort (negligence) or contract (as third-party
beneficiaries). 34 The Third District's decision was approved by the
Supreme Court of Florida. 5 Since there was no intention in any of the wills
or codicils to provide for the person suing the testator's attorney, the court
held that the claimant was not a third-party beneficiary and had no cause of
action against the attorney.36
The Supreme Court of Florida, in its Espinosa decision, stated "we
adhere to the rule that standing in legal malpractice actions is limited to
those who can show that the testator's intent as expressed in the will is
frustrated by the negligence of the testator's attorney. 37 The Fourth District
Court of Appeal denied the plaintiffs' cause of action in Babcock v.
2d at 1223); DeMaris v. Asti, 426 So. 2d 1153, 1154 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (lacking
any indication that the testator's intent had been frustrated, the complaint failed to state a
cause of action for legal malpractice); O'Neill v. Sacher, 526 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1988); Martin v. Nemec, 526 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Arnold v.
Carmichael, 524 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
33. Espinosa, 586 So. 2d at 1223 (citing McAbee v. Edwards, 340 So. 2d 1167 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976)).
34. Id.; see Espinosa v. Sparber, Shevin, Shapo, Rosen and Heilbronner, 612 So. 2d
1378, 1380 (Fla. 1993).
35. Id.; see also Hare v. Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone, 743 So. 2d 551 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
36. Id. at 1380.
37. Espinosa, 612 So. 2d at 1380.
[Vol. 27:85
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Malone.38 The plaintiffs in Babcock sued a lawyer for failure "to timely
prepare a new will for their uncle., 39 Their uncle died before signing the
new will, which resulted in the plaintiffs' obtaining nothing. 4° The appellate
court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the complaint for failure to state
a cause of action.41 The appellate court relied upon Espinosa in holding that
although the would-be beneficiaries had alleged that the attorney knew that
the uncle was very ill, no cause of action existed because their uncle never
signed the new will.42
Although Lorraine v. Grover, Ciment, Weinstein & Stauber, P.A.43
involves a lawsuit by a frustrated beneficiary against the attorney who
drafted her son's will, the court decided the matter on lack of proximate
cause." Because the court determined that the intended bequest in Lorraine
was homestead property, the property passed to the decedent's children
pursuant to article X of the Florida Constitution45 rather than to the
decedent's mother as designated in the will.46 The mother sued the attorney
who drafted the will.47 The appellate court affirmed a summary judgment in
favor of the attorney finding that the "testamentary intent was not frustrated
by [the attorney's] professional negligence, but rather by Florida's
constitution and statutes. 48  The Lorraine appellate court distinguished
McAbee v. Edwards by stating that "[t]he attorney in McAbee could have
drafted the will to" obtain the result sought by the testator; however, in
Lorraine, Florida's homestead provisions made drafting the desired result
impossible.49
A cause of action did not exist ajainst the attorney who drafted the will
at issue in Kinney v. Shinholser. The personal representative and
38. 760 So. 2d 1056 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1057.
42. Id. (citing Espinosa, 612 So. 2d at 1380).
43. 467 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
44. Id. at 316-17.
45. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(c).
46. Lorraine, 467 So. 2d at 319.
47. Id. at 317-18.
48. Id. at 319.
49. Id. at n.7; see also Mann v. Cooke, 624 So. 2d 785, 788 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1993) (holding that an attorney is not liable to third-party beneficiary of husband's revocable
trust because terms were clear and unambiguous); Rosenstone v. Satchell, 560 So. 2d 1229,
1229-30 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (relaxing strict privity requirement in area of will
drafting).
50. 663 So. 2d 643, 646 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
2002]
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beneficiary under a trust sued the lawyer who had drafted the will, claiming
that the lawyer "knew or should have known that the inclusion of the general
power of appointment in the trust would frustrate [the] intent [of the testator]
and cause an increase in [estate] taxes." 51 The only evidence of such intent
was the will's "direction that the just taxes be paid. 52 This was insufficient
to allow the personal representative and beneficiary under the trust to sue the
attorney who drafted the will for damages resulting from having to pay taxes
because of the inclusion of the general power of appointment.53 However, in
the same case, the appellate court held that a cause of action did exist against
the attorney retained to probate the will because he allegedly failed to timely
advise the client that disclaiming the power of appointment within nine
months after the death of the decedent would overcome the inclusion of the
general power of appointment in the trust.M The Kinney court found that
Espinosa's third-party beneficiary test had been satisfied since the client was
the ultimate beneficiary under the wills and trusts at issue.55 The Fourth
District in Stept v. Paoli,56 citing to Kinney, also found an attorney not liable
to revocable living trust beneficiaries who claimed that taxes were paid
unnecessarily since the trust did not contain the "expressed intent of the
testator to avoid or minimize taxes. 57
The third-party intended beneficiary exception to the privity require-
ment for bringing a legal malpractice action is not limited to will drafting; it
extends to adoptees. The case of Rushing v. Bosse58 established that "privity
between the child and attorney" is not required in a legal malpractice action
"against the attorney who institutes and proceeds with a private adoption. 59
The RushinI court stated that it did not read Angel, Cohen and Rogovin v.
Oberon Inv. as "creating an exception to the privity requirement limited
solely to the area of will drafting.",
6 1
Furthermore, the Florida courts have considered the third-party
beneficiary exception to the privity requirement in other areas, specifically
in condominium and association law. In Hunt Ridge at Tall Pines, Inc. v.
51. Id. at 644-45.
52. Id. at 645.
53. Id. at 645-46.
54. Id. at 646.
55. Kinney, 663 So. 2d at 646.
56. 701 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
57. Id. at 1229 (citing Espinosa, 586 So. 2d at 1221).
58. 652 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
59. Id. at 873.
60. 512 So. 2d 192, 193-94 (Fla. 1987).
61. Rushing, 652 So. 2d at 873.
[Vol. 27:85
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Hall,62 a homeowners' association sued an attorney claiming that its
"declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions" was invalid,
precluding the association from "perform[ing] its duties, including collecting
fees.' ' 6 3 Relying upon Espinosa, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal of
the complaint because the general partner of the limited partnership which
developed the residential community, not the homeowners' association, had
retained the attorney who drafted the declaration. 64 The homeowner's
association's argument that it was a third-party beneficiary was unpersuasive
since the declaration explicitly stated, "that its provisions were intended for
the benefit of the owners. It did not indicate that it was for the benefit of the
,,65homeowners' association.
Individual condominium unit owners, in Silver Dunes Condominium of
Destin, Inc. v. Beggs and Lane66 attempted to establish that they were
intended third-party beneficiaries of the representation by the condominium
67
association's attorney. The unit owners claimed "they were the apparent
intended third-party beneficiaries of the legal services contract between the
association and [its attorneys] because the association was at all times acting
,,68
on behalf of and for the benefit of the unit owners as their fiduciary. The
court held that the members "were not the apparent intended third-partyb ,- • • ,,69
beneficiaries. As a result of the association's lawyer having "threatened
legal action against some unit owners," the court could not conclude that the
lawyer was representing both the individual unit owners and the association
while the individual unit owners and the association were adverse to each
other.7°
As demonstrated in the results above and herein, the third-party
beneficiary exception to the privity requirement is not unlimited. 7  In
62. 766 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
63. Id. at 400.
64. Id. at 400-01 (citing Espinosa, 612 So. 2d at 1378).
65. Id.
66. 763 So. 2d 1274 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
67. Id. at 1275.
68. Id. at 1276.
69. Id. at 1277.
70. Id. See Salit v. Ruden, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell, P.A., 742 So. 2d
381, 389 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (holding an attorney who represents a corporation
owes no fiduciary duty to the shareholders) (citing Brennan v. Ruffner, 640 So. 2d 143, 145-
46 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994)).
71. Vargas v. Reinert, 547 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (concluding lack
of privity precluded suit against City of Hialeah attorney who agreed to court order to preserve
2002]
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Brennan v. Ruffner,72 a lawsuit was brought by a "disgruntled minority
shareholder of a closely held corporation" against the attorney representing
the corporation. 7  The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed a final
summary judgment74 and found "that an attorney-client relationship did not
exist between [such] shareholder and the [corporate] attorney, notwith-
standing the fact that such attorney had drafted a shareholder's agreement
76that directly affected the shareholder's rights. The appellate court was no
doubt influenced by a previous lawsuit instituted by the disgruntled minority
shareholder against the other shareholders in which the disgruntled minority
shareholder claimed that he "was not represented by counsel inthe
negotiation of the shareholder's agreement."7
78Similarly, in Chaiken v. Lewis, no error was found where the trial
court instructed the jury that "counsel for a partnership represents the
partnership entity, but does not thereby become counsel for each partner
individually. 79 In contrast to the Brennan ruling, Greenberg v. Mahoney,
Adams & Criser, P.A.8° held that the mere assertion by the client that it was
an intended third-party beneficiary was sufficient to obtain a reversal of the
lower court's decision dismissing a professional malpractice suit.8'
Assertion of privity failed in Athans v. Soble. The client in Athans
claimed that the attorney caused the loss of a potential buyer's deposit in a
real estate transaction.83 Due to record evidence supporting the client's
assertion that although the attorney dealt only with the daughter of the
plaintiff, the attorney knew that their legal services were rendered on behalf
of the plaintiff, the appellate court overturned a summary judgment in favor
of the attorney. 4
City vehicle involved in an accident but failed to inform City of order resulting in destruction
of vehicle).
72. 640 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
73. Id. at 144.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 146-47.
77. Brennan, 640 So. 2d at 145.
78. 754 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
79. Id.
80. 614 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
81. Id. at 605.
82. 553 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
83. Id. at 1362.
84. Id. at 1361-63.
[Vol. 27:85
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3. Effect of Negligent Misrepresentation and Fraud
Privity is not required when an attorney makes a negligent misrepresen-
tation to a nonclient, and lack of privity will not protect an attorney from
direct fraudulent acts or statements.86 Although the underlying facts of the
case are not discussed, Bongard v. Winter" holds that "an attorney may
properly be held liable for his or her own fraudulent misrepresentations even
if acting on behalf of a disclosed client. ' 88  However, where different
counsel represents each party, one party's counsel is not liable to the other
party for malpractice.89.
The malpractice claim was dismissed for failing to allege an attorney-
client relationship in Gutter v. Wunker;90 however, the fraud claim
survived.91 The fraud in Gutter allegedly involved failure to disclose
material facts in limited partnership documents related to a restaurant
venture.92 The court described those situations in which a claim for fraud
would lie as follows:
To state a cause of action for fraud, a party must allege: (1) a false
statement concerning a material fact; (2) the representor's knowl-
edge that the representation is false; (3) an intention that the repre-
sentation induce another to act on it; and (4) consequent injury by
the party acting in reliance on the representation. Lance v. Wade,
457 So.2d 1008 (Fla. 1984); A.S.J. Drugs, Inc. v. Berkowitz, 459
So.2d 348 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). A defendant's knowing con-
cealment or nondisclosure of a material fact may also support an
action for fraud where there is a duty to disclose. See Don Slack
Ins., Inc. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 385 So.2d 1061 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1980) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 550, 551
(1977). Furthermore, where a party in an arm's length transaction
85. Riggs Nat'l Bank of Wash., D.C. v. Freeman, 682 F. Supp. 519, 520 (S.D. Fla.
1988); see also TransPetrol, Ltd. v. Radulovic, 764 So. 2d 878, 880 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2000) (dismissing counts for fraud and RICO due to lack of duty to disclose and lack of
proximate cause); Zafiris, Inc. v. Moss, 506 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
86. Moss v. Zafiris, Inc., 524 So. 2d 1010, 1011 (Fla. 1988); A.S.J. Drugs, Inc. v.
Berkowitz, 459 So. 2d 348, 350 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (suggesting oral statement by
attorney could constitute fraud against non-client).
87. 516 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App 1987).
88. Id.
89. Drawdy v. Sapp, 365 So. 2d 461, 462 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
90. 631 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
91. Id. at 1119.
92. Id. at 1118.
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undertakes to disclose information, all material facts must be dis-
closed. Vokes v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 212 So.2d 906 (Fla. 2d DCA
1986). 9"
4. Insurer's Liability for Acts of Defense Counsel and Subrogation Rights
The issue of whether an insurance company is vicariously liable for the
malpractice of the attorney it selects to defend an insured was examined in
Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Protective National Insurance Co. of
Omaha.94 After acknowledging that cases in other jurisdictions were split on
this issue, the court was "persuaded by the reasoning of those cases which
have held that an insurance company is not vicariously liable for the
malpractice of the attorney it selects to defend the insured. 95 This reasoning
prevented Protective, an excess general liability insurance carrier, from suing
Aetna, the primary general insurance carrier and its counsel under an
equitable subrogation theory for allegedly not raising a statute of limitations
defense.96
Marlin v. State Farm97 held that an insured could not sue his carrier for
negligence in failing to exercise control over the insurance company's
appointed attorney after an excess verdict was rendered against the insured.98
The court succinctly stated "[a]s the insurer has no obligation or right to
supervise or control the professional conduct of the attorney, it is not liable
for the litigation decisions of counsel." 99
In Don Reid Ford, Inc. v. Feldman, 1° after taking over a bankrupt
insurance carrier, the Florida Insurance Guaranty Association, Inc. (FIGA),
sued the attorney appointed to represent an insured for failing to defend. 01
The result was a final judgment against the insured that was paid by FIGA. °2
A summary judgment in favor of the attorney was affirmed upon a finding
that the statute of limitations began when the oudgment against the insured
was entered, not when the judgment was paid.
93. Id. at 1118-19.
94. 631 So. 2d 305, 306 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 305-06.
97. 761 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
98. Id. at 380-81.
99. Id. at 381 (citations omitted).
100. 421 So. 2d 184, 185 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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B. Reasonable Duty
Secondly, a malpractice plaintiff must plead and prove neglect of a
reasonable duty. 4 As is more fully set out below, fulfillment of this duty
does not require the attorney to be a predictor of the future in unsettled areas
of the law, nor does it require him to inform his client of conflicting law
unless the conflicting question will soon be answered by controlling
authority.' °5 The attorney's duty does require him to exercise good faith and
to make diligent inquiry in order to be protected by judgmental immunity. 106
A cause of action exists against an attorney who neglects to perform the
services that he explicitly or impliedly agrees to when he accepts employ-
ment.1°7 However, an attorney's failure to accurately predict changes on
unsettled points of law is not actionable.' 08 A cause of action against the
attorneys in Kaufman v. Stephen Cahen, P.A.'o9 for their failure to timely file
a wrongful death claim did not exist since the law regarding the statute of
limitations for such cause of a action was changed by a Supreme Court of
Florida decision during the course of the representation. 10
However, Stake v. Harlan". holds that an attorney has a duty to inform
his or her clients of a possible change in the law known to the attorney that
could have a materially adverse effect upon the clients."' In Stake, the
attorney had actual knowledge of the certification of a question to the
Supreme Court of Florida, evidenced by his citation of the pending case in a
letter he wrote to the client." 3 The Second District Court of Appeal held
that the attorney breached his duty to make his clients aware of the
implications of the certified question, and thereby, denied his clients the
104. See DyKema v. Godfrey, 467 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
105. See generally Home Furniture Depot, Inc. v. Entevor AB, 753 So. 2d 653, 655
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (holding "a lawyer owes the client a duty to exercise the degree
of reasonable knowledge and skill which lawyers of ordinary ability and skill possess and
exercise."); Azuz v. Singer, 708 So. 2d 292, 293 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (finding that
negligence action available upon claim that stipulated final order differed from terms
authorized by client); McCurry v. Eppolito, 506 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1987)
(stating attorney's failure to see that mechanic's lien law requirements were met was
malpractice); Dykema, 467 So. 2d at 824.
106. See cases cited in supra note 105.
107. See cases cited in supra note 105.
108. See cases cited in supra note 105.
109. 507 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
110. Id. at 1152-53.
111. 529 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
112. Id. at 1186.
113. Id. at 1184-85.
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opportunity to make an informed decision on whether or not to transact the
subject real estate closing in the manner suggested by the attorney." 14
In Crosby v. Jones,' 5 the Supreme Court of Florida held that the
evaluation of an attorney's judgment could be determined as a matter of
law.' 6 The Supreme Court of Florida exercised jurisdiction because of a
conflict between districts in Jones v. Crosby" 7 and Kaufman v. Stephen
Cahen, P.A." 8 The client in Crosby released the driver of the vehicle that
collided with him, but the client did not release the driver's employer." 9
The employer obtained a summary judgment at the trial level, which was
affirmed on appeal.' 20 The attorney obtained summary judgment upon the
trial court's holding that JFK Medical Center, Inc. v. Price1 set forth the
longstanding law in Florida on the doctrine of judgmental immunity. 22 JFK
Medical Center specifically disapproved the Jones v. Gulf Coast Newspa-
pers, Inc. holding, thereby establishing that the attorney acted properly.
23
"The rule of judgmental immunity is premised on the understanding
that an attorney, who acts in good faith and makes a diligent inquiry into an
area of law, should not be held liable for providing advice or taking action in
an unsettled area of law."'' 24  At the time the attorney entered into the
dismissal with prejudice both Sun First National Bank v. Batchelor,125 which
was a decade old Supreme Court of Florida decision, and case law in the
attorney's district supported his decision. 26 The only contrary decision was
outside his district. 27 The Supreme Court of Florida went on to hold that
there is not always an absolute duty to inform the client of conflicting case
law. 12  "Attorneys cannot be placed in the position of having to accept
114. Id. at 1186.
115. 705 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. 1998).
116. Id. at 1357.
117. 677 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
118. 507 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
119. Crosby, 705 So. 2d at 1357.
120. Jones v. Gulf Coast Newspapers, Inc., 595 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1992).
121. 647 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1994).
122. See Crosby, 705 So. 2d at 1357.
123. Id. (citing JFK Medical Center, Inc., 647 So. 2d at 833).
124. Crosby, 705 So. 2d at 1358 (Fla. 1998); accord Meir v. Kirk, Pinkerton
McClelland, Savary & Carr, P.A., 561 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
125. 321 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1975).
126. See, e.g., Crosby, 705 So. 2d at 1358, 1359.
127. Id. at 1359 (citing Walsingham v. Browning, 525 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1988)).
128. Id.
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direction from clients on intricate interpretations of the correct or current
state of the law. The, attorney, not the client, is the individual trained to
interpret the law."' 29 The Kaufman holding was approved in Crosby.130
Stake was distinguished "because the issue was pending on a certified
question before this Court at the time the attorney rendered the advice; thus
the attorney had the duty to inform the client that issue would soon be
decided by a higher court."'
3
'
The attorney's good faith and diligent inquiry are questions of fact.
The appellate court in DeBiasi v. Snaith132 indicated that the attorney's
actions in failing to timely seek a motion for certification were not "fairly
debatable" and did not deal with an "unsettled area of the law" to which
judgmental immunity would apply; thus, it reversed a summary judgment in
the attorney's favor. The DeBiasi court held that "Crosby v. Jones teaches
that the lawyer who seeks the protection of judgmental immunity must have
acted in good faith and made a diligent inquiry into that area of the law."' 34
Since the issues of good faith and diligent inquiry remained unresolved, the
"case was not ripe for summary disposition."' 13
Judgmental immunity does not insulate the attorney from exercising
ordinary care. Both Crosby and DeBiasi were relied upon in Sauer v.
Flanagan and Maniotis, P.A. 36  Sauer sued her attorneys alleging their
failure to properly advise her regarding her rejection of a million dollar offer
of judgment. The underlying trial resulted in a defense verdict and the
imposition of attorney's fees and costs against the client. 138  In the
malpractice action, the attorneys argued that the defense of judgmental
immunity should apply to settlement recommendations. 39 The court could
"discern no basis for concluding that an attorney is insulated from liability
129. Id.
130. Id. (citing Kaufman, 507 So. 2d at 1152).
131. Crosby, 705 So. 2d at 1359 n.3.
132. 732 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
133. Id. at 16.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. 748 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000). See also Dollman v. Shutts and
Bowen, 575 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (reversing summary judgment due to
factual issues surrounding communication of proposed sale of real estate).
137. Sauer, 748 So. 2d at 1080.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1081.
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for failing to exercise ordinary skill and care in resolving settlement
issues.", 14 0
It was undisputed that the attorney accused of malpractice in Herig v.
Akerman, Senterfitt & Edison14' "acted in good faith and made a diligent
inquiry into the law [that] was not disputed."'' 42 Accordingly, the summary
judgment in favor of the attorney was affirned since, at the time the attorney
was engaged to prepare a personal management contract for a minor, "there
was no statute or case law governing artistic management contracts of
minors per se." 14 3 The enactment of the Child Performer and Athlete
Protection Act,' 44 adopted several years after the agreement was signed,
allowed the agreement to be set aside. 145  Therefore, the attorney was
protected by the doctrine of judgmental immunity.146
An attorney does not owe a duty in a real estate closing to any party
other than the attorney's client, 47 or in a will drafting to a previous
beneficiary when an attorney omits the beneficiary at the request of the
testator or testatrix.148 "[V]iolation of the Rules of Professional Conduct ...
[is not] negligence per se[; however, a violation] may be used as some
evidence of negligence.' ' 49 The Rules of Professional Conduct do not create
a legal duty on a lawyer. 150 However, evidence that an attorney did not
conduct himself or herself as reasonably as an attorney, with respect to the
140. Id. at 1082.
141. 741 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999). It should be noted that the correct
name of the law firm is Akerman, Senterfitt & Eidson, but the official reporter misspelled the
firm name.
142. Id. at 593.
143. Id.
144. FLA. STAT. § 743.08 (3)(b) (1997).
145. Herig, 741 So. 2d at 594.
146. Id.
147. Assad v. Mendell, 511 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (stating that a
bank's attorney owed no duty to borrower); Southworth v. Crevier, 438 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (stating that a seller's attorney in real estate transaction had no duty to
buyer); Amey, Inc. v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, P.A., 367 So. 2d 633, 634 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (stating that a bank's law firm owed no duty to buyer for the negligent
performance of a title search); Adams v. Chenowith, 349 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1977) (stating that a seller's attorney owed no duty to purchaser since seller's and purchaser's
interests were adverse and there was no allegation of intentional misrepresentation against the
attorneys).
148. Chase v. Bowen, 771 So. 2d 1181, 1182 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
149. Pressley v. Farley, 579 So. 2d 160, 161 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991), dismissed,
583 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 1991).
150. Id.
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Code of Professional Responsibility, is evidence of a failure to use due care
as an attorney.' 5 '
Moreover, an attorney has no duty to pursue faultless or judgment proof
parties. During the investigation of a potential lawsuit arising from an
automobile accident, the law firm, which was sued in Williams v. Beckham
& McAliley, P.A., 152 had determined that no liable party had insurance or
assets. 153 The law firm had filed a lawsuit prior to the expiration of the
statute of limitations for the purpose of preserving the cause of action.'
54
When no action was taken in the lawsuit, the court dismissed the suit for
lack of prosecution. 155 Affirming the summary judgment in favor of the law
firm, the appellate court held that the law firm had no duty to pursue any
party it felt, after investigation, was not culpable or collectible.
5 6
Finally, an attorney's duty does not require him to take futile action on
behalf of his client. In Hunzinger Construction Corp. v. Quarles & Brady
General Partnership,157 the client claimed that its lawyers should have
submitted a claim to its insurance company in a construction litigation
case. 15  If the claim had been submitted, the client argued, the insurance
company would have provided a defense and paid for the attorney's fees
which the client had to pay. 59 The client suffered an adverse summary
judgment. 160 The appellate court found no error in the trial court's
determination "that there was no duty owed to the client on the part of the
lawyer to submit the defense to the insurance company, where the complaint
did not allege any cause of action which arguably came within the coverage
of the policy.'
61
C. Proximate Cause of Loss
The third element that a legal malpractice plaintiff must plead and
prove is that the attorney's negligence resulted in and was the proximate
151. Gomez v. Hawkins Concrete Const. Co., 623 F. Supp. 194, 199 (N.D. Fla. 1985).
152. 582 So. 2d 1206 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
153. Id. at 1207.
154. Id. at 1208
155. Id. at 1207.
156. Id. at 1208.
157. 735 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
158. Id. at 592.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 593.
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cause of loss to the plaintiff. 62 The general tort law that "[n]o damages may
be recovered where losses do not usually result from or could not have been
foreseen as a proximate result of a particular negligence" is set forth in the
legal malpractice case of Chadwick v. Corbin. 16  However, "once a negli-
gent act occurs, the actor will be liable for injury flowing therefrom, unless
'an act unforeseeable to him and independent of his negligence intervenes to
cause the loss."''64
[A]n attorney who drafts documents is not ipso facto a guarantor
that the documents will be litigation free or will accomplish every-
thing that the client might want .... The rationale is that if there
were malpractice liability under those circumstances, an attorney
would in effect insure his work; but since insurance coverage ordi-
narily calls for premium payment, attorneys fees would inevitably
increase substantially to provide for that type of insurance.
165
In Hatcher v. Roberts,'66 a client-mortgagor brought a legal malpractice
action against its attorney and law firm contending that in the underlying
foreclosure proceeding the lawyer negligently withdrew an affirmative
defense of prepayment. 67 The First District Court of Appeal found, as did
the trial court, "that, under all the facts, circumstances, and law existing at
the time of the foreclosure suit, the prepayment defense asserted and then
withdrawn in the foreclosure proceeding could not possibly have succeeded,
even with diligent preparation and litigation by" the attorney.' 68 Therefore,
since the attorney's acts were not the proximate cause of the client's alleged
damages, no legal malpractice had occurred. 169
162. Home Furniture Depot, Inc. v. Entevor AB, 753 So. 2d 653, 655 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2000).
163. 476 So. 2d 1366, 1368 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (citing 17 FLA. JUR. 2d
DAMAGES § 38); accord Ferrari v. Vining, 744 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
164. Mitrani v. Druckman, 576 So. 2d 406, 408 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (citing
State Farm Ins. Co. v. Nu Prime Roll-A-Way of Miami, Inc., 557 So. 2d 107, 109 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1990)).
165. Daytona Dev. Corp. v. McFarland, 505 So. 2d 464, 467 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1987).
166. 478 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
167. Id. at 1085.
168. Id. at 1086.
169. Id. at 1087; accord Pennington v. Caggiano, 723 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1999) (holding attorneys who withdrew were not responsible for former client's failure
or inability to obtain substitute counsel prior to loss on a summary judgment in a medical
malpractice proceeding).
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An attorney will not be liable if "some separate force or action is the
active and efficient intervening cause, the sole proximate cause or an
independent cause."'170 However, if the negligent attorney sets off a chain of
events resulting in harm, or if the intervening cause is foreseeable, his
negligence may be considered the proximate cause notwithstanding the
intervening cause. 171
If the client causes his own damages, the attorney will not be held
liable. 172 In Goodwin v. Alexatos,173 an attorney represented both the seller
and purchaser of an orange grove. 174 Problems developed after the closing
of the transaction, and the purchaser demanded a return of his money for,
among other reasons, the attorney's failure to clear certain title impediments
which were known at the time of closing. 7 5  When the money was not• 176
forthcoming, the purchaser sued the seller and the attorney. One of the
claims against the attorney was for malpractice in failing to clear the title to
the property. 177 The directed verdict on the malpractice claim was upheld on
appeal upon a finding that the "proximate cause was [the purchaser's]
decision to abandon the transaction, not any delay allegedly caused by [the
attorney].' 7 7
The issue in Boyd v. Brett-Major79 was "whether the attorney followed
the explicit directions of his client."' i8 The jury found that the client had
instructed his attorney to delay, rather than win, a mortgage foreclosure.'
8
'
Accordingly, the lawyer did not plead the absolute defense provided by
section 903.14 of the Florida Statutes s2 against the bonding company,
170. DWL, Inc. v. Foster, 396 So. 2d 726, 728 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (citing
Gibson v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 386 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 1980)).
171. DWL, Inc., 396 So. 2d at 728 (citing Gibson, 386 So. 2d at 522). See also
Daytona Dev. Corp. v. McFarland, 505 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (reversing
summary judgment for determination of whether lawyer was proximate cause of client's
damages in a real estate matter).
172. Davenport v. Stone, 528 So. 2d 45, 46 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (noting client
who was fully advised and voluntarily signed property settlement agreement suffered no loss
due to attorneys incompetence).
173. 584 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
174. Id. at 1009.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1009-10.
177. Id. at 1010.
178. Goodwin, 584 So. 2d at 1010.
179. 449 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
180. Id. at954.
181. Id.
182. FLA. STAT. § 903.14 (2001).
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which was foreclosing upon its mortgage, resulting in a summary judgment
adverse to the client.!13 Finding no cases in Florida on point, the court cited
to Orr v. Knowles,'84 for the following proposition:
It is not the role of an attorney acting as counsel to independently
determine what is best for his client and then act accordingly.
Rather, such an attorney is to allow the client to determine what is
in the client's best interests and then act according to the wishes of
[the] client within the limits of the law.18 5
The Boyd court was not impressed by the argument that its ultimate
holding in favor of the attorney would allow lawyers to avoid liability by
saying they followed their client's instructions.'86
The lawyer in Lawyers Professional Liability Ins. Co. v. McKenzie s7
was sued for the profit allegedly lost by the client who had to go through two
foreclosure sales before the litigation was complete. 18 In the first
foreclosure sale, the mortgagor did not redeem the property, and the client-
mortgagee was the highest bidder at the sale. 189 The mortgagee had been
negotiating with a third party to purchase the property after the completion
of the foreclosure. 19° After the sale, the lawyer realized that the legal
description was wrong, which ultimately resulted in the scheduling of
another foreclosure sale.' 9 ' Before the second sale, the mortgagor located a
buyer for the property who paid off the mortgagee. 192 The court found that
the
[AIttorney, though negligent, did in fact do what he was employed
to do. He foreclosed on the mortgage and [the client] received all
that she was entitled to under the terms of the instrument. She did
183. Boyd, 449 So. 2d at 953.
184. 337 N.W.2d 699, 702 (Neb. 1983).
185. Boyd, 449 So. 2d at 954 (quoting Orr v. Knowles, 337 N.W.2d 699, 702 (Neb.
1983)).
186. Id.
187. 470 So. 2d 752 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
188. Id. at 753.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 752.
191. Id. at 753.
192. Lawyers Professional Liability Ins. Co., 470 So. 2d at 753.
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not prove that [the attorney's] negligence was a proximate cause of
her failure to get the property back.
193
Similarly, the lawyer in Snaith v. Haraldson,'94 who drafted balloon
mortgage language and represented both the mortgagor and mortgagee, had
no liability to the mortgagor for failing to properly provide for the legend
required by section 697.05(2)(a) of the Florida Statutes, because the
deficiency did not cause any damages to the mortgagor. 1 95 Although the
Fourth District Court of Appeal in Lefebvre v. James'9 did not mention the
lack of proximate cause as its reasoning for overturning the jury verdict, its
reversal was based upon the fact that the lawyer's failure to amend the
complaint to add a cause of action did not result in any damages to the
client.1 97  The case involved damages to a. farmer's livestock allegedly
because of a problem with the feed delivered to the farmer.' 98 The company
that delivered the feed became bankrupt, and its insurer denied coverage
based upon the pleadings that set forth a defective product theory.'99
Negligent delivery would have been covered under the policy. The attorney
considered adding a claim for negligent delivery, but he did not amend
because he thought that the amendment would not have related back to the
original cause of action and would therefore be barred by the statute of
limitations. 200 The trial court disagreed and ruled as a matter of law that the
amendment would have related back.20 1 The appellate court agreed with the
lawyer's assessment and found that "an amendment to the complaint alleging
negligent delivery of the feed would have constituted a new cause of action,
would not have related back to the filing of the claim, and would have been
barred by the statute of limitations." 2-02 Therefore, the appellate court
193. Id. at 754.
194. 466 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
195. Id.; accord Singer v. William H. Stolberg, P.A., 770 So. 2d 1281, 1282 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (holding an attorney "is not negligent for failing to enforce an order the
trial court was not required to enforce").
196. 697 So. 2d 918 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
197. Id. at 920.
198. Id. at 918.
199. Id. at 919.
200. Id.
201. Lefebvre, 697 So. 2d at 919.
202. Id. at 920. See School Bd. of Broward County v. Surette, 394 So. 2d 147 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
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instructed the lower court to enter a directed verdict in favor of the203
attorney.
In another example of lack of proximate cause, the attorney who filed
an Age Discrimination in Employment Act claim on behalf of his client in
Bolves v. Hullinger2 4 escaped liability for his failure to timely file suit based
upon the appellate court's finding that "[t]here was a complete absence of
evidence of intentional or reckless disregard for whether [the employer's]
actions were in violation of the ADEA.' 'z 5 Since no damages were available
in the underlying action, even if the lawsuit had been timely filed, the
attorney's "negligence in allowing the statute of limitations to expire on the
federal claim did not result in damage to [the client]."206
Lack of proximate cause is determinative of a cause of action even
where the attorneys' negligence, as in Olmsted v. Emmanuel,2°7 is clear. In
the pretrial stipulation, the plaintiff's attorneys failed to invoke Title 42,
section 1981 of the United States Code20 as a basis for recovery. 2°9 The
only basis for recovery invoked was Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 .210 Accordingly, the $3,460,000 jury award was reduced to $300,000
because of the $300,000 cap under Title VII, which would not have applied
to a section 1981 action. The court summarized the law on proximate
cause after setting out the elements of a legal malpractice cause of action:
212
"Fo be liable for malpractice arising out of litigation, the attorney
must be the proximate cause of the adverse outcome of the underly-
ing action which results in damage to the client." The plaintiff
must "demonstrate [ ] that there is an amount of damages which
[he] would have recovered but for the attorney's negligence."
Thus, in a case such as this, the plaintiff has to prove that he
"would have prevailed on the underlying action but for the attor-
ney's negligence." In this case, there is no dispute about the facts
that Olmsted retained appellees and that appellees neglected a rea-
sonable duty owed to Olmsted when they failed to invoke 42
203. Id.
204. 629 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
205. Id. at201.
206. Id.
207. 783 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
208. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000).
209. Olmsted, 783 So. 2d at 1124.
210. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3.
211. Olmsted, 783 So. 2d at 1124.
212. See generally, supra note 2 (citing cases that describe the elements of a legal
malpractice cause of action).
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U.S.C. § 1981 as a basis for relief in the pretrial stipulation, result-
ing in the holding that any claim pursuant to section 1981 had been
abandoned. Here, the dispute relates to the third element, i.e.,
whether Olmsted can establish that appellees' negligence was the
proximate cause of a loss to him.213
After examining Eleventh Circuit cases involving section 1981 claims,
the court concluded that the client could not establish that he would have
214
met the legal requirements of a section 1981 claim. Accordingly, since the
client could not satisfy the proximate cause element, the court affirmed the
dismissal of the legal malpractice claim under section 1981.215
The malpractice plaintiff may use expert testimony to establish that the
client would have recovered damages but for the actions of the attorney or
that the client would have recovered more in damages but for the attorney's
actions. The use of expert testimony to establish causation was examined in
Tarleton v. Arnstein & Lehr.26 The client sued her lawyer as a result of
losing the right to sue upon certain promissory notes due to the release
217
clause in her divorce proceeding settlement agreement. After indicating
that one element of a legal malpractice case is proving that "the attorney's
negligence resulted in and was the proximate cause of loss to the client,
' 21a
which requires the client to demonstrate that "there is an amount of damages
which the client would have recovered but for the attorney's negligence, 21 9
the court stated that the appeal "focuses on whether the Former Wife
presented sufficient evidence to satisfy the third element.,
220
The client produced a legal expert who testified as to standard of care
and an accountant who testified regarding damages.22' The trial court judge
overturned a jury verdict in favor of the client, reasoning that she had not
established proximate cause because she failed to present testimony
indicating that a more favorable result would have occurred in the divorce
213. Olmsted, 783 So. 2d at 1125-26 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
214. Id. at 1128.
215. Id. See also Somerset Village, Ltd. P'ship v. Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel,
Smith & Cutler, P.A., 782 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (failing to obtain transcript
not proximate cause of summary judgment affinance).
216. 719 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
217. Id. at 327.
218. Id. at 328.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Tarleton, 719 So. 2d at 328.
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222proceeding had the attorney acted differently. The Fourth District Court
of Appeal reinstated the jury verdict finding "that the lay jury was competent
to determine that Former Wife would have been awarded more but for the
Firm's negligence. 223 The Court went on to state as follows:
Under the "trial within a trial" standard of proving proximate
cause, the jury necessarily has to determine whether the client
would have prevailed in the underlying action, in this case the dis-
solution action, before determining whether the client would pre-
vail in the malpractice action. Because the jury is substituting its
judgment for the fact finder of the dissolution proceeding, no ex-
pert testimony specifically stating that a reasonable judge would
have given her more than she received in the settlement agreement
would be required to establish proximate causation. To establish
proximate causation, Former Wife must demonstrate that there is
an amount of damages which she would have recovered but for the
Firm's negligence. From the evidence noted above, the jury, sitting
as the trier of fact in the dissolution action, determined the amount
Former Wife would have been awarded if she went to trial and
concluded that the amount was greater than she received under the
settlement agreement. Thus, Former Wife has established the
proximate cause element. 224
Whether an attorney's negligence is the proximate cause of his client's
injury is a question of fact. Although the Fourth District Court of Appeal
found that the attorney's conduct fell below a reasonable standard of care in
Spaziano v. Price,225 a jury verdic't in favor of the attorney was upheld
because "the question submitted to the jury was whether there was
negligence on the part of [the attorney] which was a legal cause of loss,
injury or damage to Spaziano. The jury chose to answer that question in the
,,226
negative. Since there was conflicting evidence on whether the client
suffered any injuries from the airplane crash, which formed the basis for the
underlying case that was dismissed because of the Warsaw Convention's
two-year statute of limitations, the jury's resolution of the disputed issues of
fact was not disturbed.227
222. Id. at 330.
223. Id.
224. Id. (citations omitted).
225. 763 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
226. Id. at 1049.
227. Id. at 1049-50.
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Im. EFFECT OF MULTIPLE REPRESENTATIONS
Multiple attorney representation of a client affects an attorney's liability
for malpractice. Subsequent representation by another attorney may relieve
an attorney of malpractice liability, and referral by an attorney spreads the
liability. An attorney is not liable for his omission if subsequent counsel had
the opportunity to perform the act and avoid the problem. This issue is
228
examined in Frazier v. Effinan. Lisa Frazier retained attorney Steven
Effman in a medical malpractice action.229 Effman did not join Florida
Patient's Compensation Fund as a defendant.230 Gary Rotella replaced
Effman as Frazier's attorney. 3 Although he could have done so during his
stewardship of the case, Rotella did not join the Compensation Fund
either. 232 Frazier retained a third lawyer who discovered the non-joinder by
Frazier and Effman and the expiration of the limitations period to join the
Compensation Fund.233  Frazier sued both Rotella and Effman for legal
malpractice. 234 The appellate court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the
action against Effman with prejudice.235 "Under the circumstances of this
case, where the complaint shows that the defendant lawyer was discharged
and new counsel retained long before the claim became barred, a claim of
negligence cannot be maintained., 236 The court made no mention of the
proceeding against Rotella.
The extent of a referring lawyer's responsibility for the negligence of
237
the trial attorney was resolved in Norris v. Silver. The trial attorney and
the referring attorney had shared fees on other cases without any written
agreement. 2T8 Under rule 4-1.5 of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar,
when fees are divided "each lawyer assumes joint legal responsibility for the,.,239
representation. Therefore, a division of fees automatically spreads the
228. 501 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
229. Id. at 115.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Frazier, 501 So. 2d at 115.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. 701 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
238. Id. at 1239.
239. Id. at 1240 (citing R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.5(g)(2)).
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liability between the two attorneys.2M The plaintiffs were required to "prove
an express or implied agreement to divide the fee.
' '2 1
IV. PLEADING REQUIREMENTS
Proper pleading of an action against an attorney for malpractice
requires pleading more than bare legal assertions; however, even such a
complaint should not be dismissed where capable of being cured. The naked
legal conclusion that an attorney was negligent will not satisfy the pleading
requirements for legal malpractice. 242 Nevertheless, as with other causes of
action, a court will only examine the "four corners of the complaint" to
determine if the allegations are sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a cause of action.
24 3
A dismissal with prejudice was affirmed in Bankers Trust Realty, Inc. v.
Kluger.244 This harsh sanction resulted from the failure to "state any of the
specifics of the alleged malpractice."'24 5 The complaint merely stated the
"insufficient legal conclusion that the attorneys 'negligently, carelessly,
unskillfully and tardily conducted the ... action and delayed obtaining a
judgment therein."' 246 However, Breakers of Ft. Lauderdale, Ltd. v.
Cassel247 overturned a trial court ruling dismissing a complaint for legal
malpractice with prejudice because the complaint, "while deficient in that it
240. R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.5(g)(2)(A) (2002).
241. Norris, 701 So. 2d at 1241.
242. Rios v. McDermott, Will & Emery, 613 So. 2d 544, 545 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1993); Pressley v. Farley, 579 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991), cause dismissed, 583
So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 1991); Dillard Smith Constr. Co. v. Greene, 337 So. 2d 841, 843 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that a client's allegation that attorney had neglected to keep
client informed, without more, lacks specificity as well as a causative relationship to client's
alleged loss and is insufficient to state cause of action for legal malpractice).
243. Bricker v. Kay, 446 So. 2d 1151, 1152 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984). See also
Baycon Indus. v. Shea, 714 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Thompson v. Martin,
530 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (a complaint need only indicate that a cause of
action exists and need not anticipate affirmative defenses).
244. 672 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct, App. 1996). See also Conley v. Shutts &
Bowen, P.A., 616 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (amended complaint did not allege
sufficient facts to state a cause of action, dismissal with prejudice affirmed).
245. Bankers Trust Realty, Inc., 672 So. 2d at 898.
246. Id.
247. 528 So. 2d 985 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
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failed to establish conclusively when appellant actually knew that its
attorney's conduct constituted malpractice, was not beyond cure."4
8
V. VENUE
In general, the venue for a negligence suit is where the plaintiff suffers
249his or her injuries. In legal malpractice suits, this rule is not always easily
250 251
applied. In Tucker v. Fianson, the attorney being sued practiced and
252
resided in Broward County, Florida. The malpractice complaint alleged
that the attorney had rendered negligent advice regarding a condominium
conversion in Dade County, Florida, and the client chose to sue in Dade
County, Florida. 2 3 The trial court denied the attorney's motion to transfer
254the case to Broward County. In affirming the trial court's ruling, the Third
District Court of Appeal relied upon section 47.011 of the Florida
255Statutes, and the court adopted the rule that "for venue purposes, a tort
claim is deemed to have accrued where the last event necessary to make the
defendant liable for the tort took place. 256 The court graphically described
its ruling by invoking a bow and arrow theme.257 "In sum, it is claimed that,
while lawyer Tucker negligently shot his arrow into the air of Broward
County, it did no harm and had no effect until it fell to earth in Dade. It is
therefore here that he must answer for his asserted error."
' 58
The bow and arrow analogy was also attempted in Roberts v. Cason,
259
where one concurring justice could not tell from the record whether "the
arrow shot into the air in Orange County fell to earth in Orange or Lake
County. ,260 In the same case, the dissenting judge suggested that the arrow
248. Id. at 986. See also Parker v. Gordon, 442 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1983) (amended complaint explicit on facts but obscure as to causes of action dismissed);
Kartikes v. Demos, 214 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (dismissing case without leave
to amend reversed).
249. Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 201 So. 2d 743, 745 (Fla. 1967).
250. The lack of a transcript of the motion to transfer venue hearing prevented review
in McFadden v. Wolfman & Greenfield, P.A., 616 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
251. 484 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
252. Id. at 1371.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. FLA. STAT. § 47.011 (2001).
256. Tucker, 484 So. 2d at 1371.
257. Id. at 1372.
258. Id.
259. 652 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
260. Id. at 440-41 (Harris, C.J., concurring specially).
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"did not land (i.e., accrue) any place at all based upon the plaintiffs'
amended complaint, which is woefully inadequate., 26' The underlying facts
in Roberts indicate that a real estate closing involving property located in
Lake County was held in Orange County.26 The plaintiff filed suit in
Orange County against attorneys having a place of business only in Lake263
County. The Roberts court, relying upon Tucker, held that venue was
properly placed in Orange County because that is where the allegedly
264negligent closing took place.
The allegedly injured client in Weiner v. Prudential Mortgage
Investors, Inc.265 brought suit in Dade County, Florida against its attorneys
who lived and practiced in Marion County, notwithstanding a claim that a
266foreclosure suit had not been brought in Alachua County as instructed.
The aggrieved client attempted to construct a claim based upon false
communications in Dade County.267  The court deemed the attempt
"chimerical," and it was disregarded for venue purposes.268
The dates of service of process, of filing for legal malpractice, and of
filing an action for fees were critical in Hollywood Lakes Country Club, Inc.
v. Silver & Waldman, P.A.269 The law firm of Silver and Waldman, P.A.,
was served with a suit for malpractice in Broward County, Florida, on
October 27, 1998.270 At the time of service, Hollywood Lakes County Club
was not a plaintiff in the Broward County proceeding. 27  In Miami-Dade
County, Florida, on October 29, 1998, Silver and Waldman filed suit to
272
recover attorneys' fees against Hollywood Lakes. Hollywood Lakes was
added as a party plaintiff in the Broward proceeding on November 25,
1998. On November 19, 1998, six days prior to becoming a party plaintiff
in the Broward action, Hollywood Lakes sought to have the Miami-Dade
261. Id. at 442 (Cobb, J., dissenting).
262. Id. at 440.
263. Id.
264. Roberts, 652 So. 2d at 442. See also Williams v. Goldsmith, 619 So. 2d 330 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (holding legal malpractice claim and other claims properly venued
where last event necessary to make the defendant liable for the tort took place).
265. 557 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
266. Id. at 913.
267. Id. at 913 n.1.
268. Id.
269. 737 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
270. Id. at 1194-95.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 1195.
273. Id.
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case transferred to Broward County.2 74 The trial- court denied the motion.275
The appellate court relied upon rule 1.170(a) of the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure, and it held that the Miami-Dade case was a compulsory
276counterclaim. Since the plaintiffs perfected service of process over Silver
and Waldman in the Broward County case before the Miami-Dade action
was filed, the appellate court remanded the case with instructions to transfer
the Miami-Dade action to Broward County.
Venue was proper in two different counties in Ivey v. Padgett. The
legal malpractice claim was filed both as a contract action, for which venue
would be where the alleged breach occurred, and in tort, for which venue
would be where the act (or omission) occurred.278 The alleged malpractice
was for failure to timely file a medical malpractice case against a Volusia
County doctor.27 9 The attorney resided in Putnam County.28° The court
found that venue was proper in Volusia County because that is where the281
lawsuit was to be filed. The county in which the defendants resided was
282
also proper from a venue perspective. Since the plaintiff's choice of
venue is generally favored, the case proceeded where the plaintiff filed suit,
283in Volusia County.
VI. JURISDICTION
Legal services are often provided to Florida citizens by non-resident
law firms. In Florida, in order to sue a non-resident lawyer, two require-
ments must be met. First, Florida's long arm statute must be applicable.
28 4
Second, minimum contacts must 'exist in order to satisfy due process
285
requirements.
274. Hollywood Lakes Country Club, Inc., 737 So. 2d at 1195.
275. Id.
276. The court cited to Johnson v. Allen, Knudsen, DeBoest, Edwards & Rhodes, P.A.,
621 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that a "malpractice action and a fee
dispute based upon the same representation invokes the compulsory counterclaim provision of
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.170(a)").
277. 502 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
278. Id. at 23.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Ivey, 502 So. 2d at 23.
283. Id.
284. FLA. STAT. § 48.193 (2002).
285. Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So. 2d 499, 502 (Fla. 1989).
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The first consideration is Florida's long arm statute. A retainer
agreement spanning several years can satisfy the requirements of Florida's
long arm statute. The denial of a law firm's motion to abate for lack of
personal jurisdiction was affirmed in Windels, Marx, Davies & Ives v.
286Solitron Devices, Inc. The law firm was retained by its client, monthly,
over a period of several years. 287 The court found that there was "record of
substantial activity in Florida, ' 288 which satisfied section 48.193 of the
Florida Statutes.
If Florida's long arm statute is satisfied, further analysis is necessary.
After satisfying itself that the plaintiff had not established jurisdiction under
, 289
Florida's long arm statute, the court in Horowitz v. Laske did not reach the
minimum contacts analysis. In that case, the lawyer's "brief and insubstan-
tial" 290 contacts with Florida did not amount to engaging in a business
venture, and the alleged tortious acts were not committed in Florida.
291
Since neither section 48.193(l)(a) nor 48.193(l)(b) of the Florida Statutes
was satisfied, the court found no personal jurisdiction.292
Establishing jurisdiction under Florida's long arm statute must be
accomplished by establishing minimum contacts. In Florida, minimum
contacts are not established where an out-of-state law firm delivers a legal
opinion for use in Florida. A nonfinal order finding personal jurisdiction
over a New York law firm that rendered an opinion regarding a Florida real
estate transaction was overturned on appeal in Fleming & Weiss, P.C. v.
First American Title Ins. Co. 2 93 "To render a nonresident defendant subject
to jurisdiction in a Florida court, the statutory requirements of the long-arm
statute and the minimum contacts requirement must be met., 294 The New
York law firm had delivered its legal opinion in Florida for use by a Florida
286. 510 So. 2d 1177, 1179 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
287. ld. at 1177.
288. Id. at 1178.
289. 751 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999), overruled by Wendt v. Horowitz,
822 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 2002).
290. Id. at 85.
291. Id. at 86.
292. Id. See Hill v. Sidly & Austin, 762 F. Supp. 931, 935 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (noting
long arm jurisdiction requirements were satisfied, but minimum contacts were insufficient in
an attorney law firm dispute).
293. 580 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
294. Id. at 647 (citing Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So. 2d at 499 (Fla.
1989).
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bank in transacting a Florida loan.295 The appellate court found these acts
insufficient to establish the required minimum contacts. 6
Florida lacked jurisdiction over a Washington law firn in Foster,
Pepper & Riviera v. Hansard,297 which involved investors in a limited
partnership suing a law firm that had prepared a private placement
29
memorandum. 298 The court found that the law firm's
[Slole act of preparing a part of the private placement memoran-
dum, in the absence of any other contacts with Florida or the pur-
chasers of the securities, was insufficient to constitute engaging in
business in Florida for purposes of long-arm jurisdiction. More-
over, subjecting Foster[,] Pepper[, and Rivera] to Florida jurisdic-
tion under these circumstances does not satisfy the minimum con-
299tacts requirements of due process.
VII. MALPRACTICE IN CRIMINAL DEFENSE
Legal malpractice proceedings stemming from representation in
criminal matters differ from those stemming from other types of legal
representation. The case of Orr v. Black & Furci, P.A. 300 is a good example.
Orr holds that "[w]hile proximate causation ordinarily is a factual issue, in
certain cases proximate cause may be determined as a matter of law, based
on fairness and considerations of public policy. '30 1 The issue in Orr was
whether Florida courts would adopt the majority rule that a criminal
defendant's guilty plea foreseeably and substantially caused the injury from
a conviction.302 The court adopted the majority rule and held that "when
criminal defendants plead guilty to a crime, as malpractice plaintiffs they
must prove their innocence in order to maintain a cause of action against
their attorney. 3 °3 Since the plaintiff in Orr pled guilty, the court ruled that
the motion for summary judgment against the client on the professional
malpractice claim was correctly granted. 3°
295. Id.
296. Id. at 648.
297. 611 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
298. Id.
299. Id. at 582.
300. 876 F. Supp. 1270 (M.D. Fla. 1995).
301. Id. at 1276 (citation omitted).
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 1278.
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In addition to proximate cause being determined as a matter of law in
some criminal cases, and criminal defendants being required as malpractice
plaintiffs to prove their innocence after pleading guilty, a criminal
defendant-malpractice plaintiff has a condition precedent to a malpractice
suit. In Steele v. Kehoe,0 5 the Supreme Court of Florida answered the
following certified question in the affirmative: "when a convicted defendant
alleges that his or her attorney agreed to file a postconviction motion on his
or her behalf, but failed to do so in a timely manner... must a defendant
prevail in having his or her conviction or sentence reduced before filing a
legal malpractice action?
' 3°6
After reviewing policy arguments from various cases, the court
determined "that a convicted criminal defendant must obtain appellate or
postconviction relief as a precondition to maintaining a legal malpractice
action. '' °7 However, the statute of limitations for the malpractice action
does "not commence until the defendant has obtained final appellate or
postconviction relief.
308
In Rowe v. Schreiber,3° the Fourth District Court of Appeal followed
the Steele holding, prior to it being rendered,310 in finding that "a defendant
must successfully obtain post-conviction relief for the cause of action to
accrue in a case involving the legal malpractice of a criminal defense
attorney.0 1'1 Rowe goes one step further and requires a plaintiff suing a
criminal defense attorney for negligence "to prove by the greater weight of
the evidence that he was innocent of the crimes charged in the underlying
criminal proceeding.
3 12
Collateral estoppel is an affirmative defense to malpractice in criminal
defense. The Supreme Court of Florida in Zeidwig v. Ward 13 answered the
following rephrased certified question in the negative: "whether identity or
mutuality of the parties or their privies is a prerequisite in Florida to the
defensive application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel in the criminal-to-
305. 747 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 1999).
306. Id. at 932.
307. Id. at 933.
308. Id. See also Manley v. Crawford, 753 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000);
Rosen v. Thomas E. Cazel, P.A., 739 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
309. 725 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
310. In so doing, the court followed the district court decision in Steele v. Kehoe, 724
So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App 1998).
311. Rowe, 725 So. 2d at 1249.
312. Id. at 1251.
313. 548 So. 2d209 (Fla. 1989).
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civil context. ' ' 3 14 The criminal client in Zeidwig had unsuccessfully asserted
an "ineffective assistance of counsel" argument in the criminal proceeding
with regard to certain recorded conversations that he alleged would have
exonerated him.315 The malpractice case was based upon the use of the same
tapes. 316 The attorney's argument-that the client was collaterally estopped
from proceeding on the same theory that was lost in the criminal proceeding
-trumped the client's argument that the identity of the parties in the two
proceedings were not the same, rendering the doctrine inapplicable.317
VIII. DEFENSES
Various affirmative defenses have been asserted in malpractice actions
against attorneys. Res judicata and a variety of estoppel defenses are
available. An attorney may also plead the comparative negligence of his
client. In pari delicto and fraud by the client are additional aff'rmative
defenses to be used where appropriate.
A. Estoppel
Regarding malpractice in a civil case, the affirmative defenses of res
judicata, collateral estoppel, estoppel based upon taking a position
inconsistent with one taken in a prior suit involving the same party, and
estoppel in pais are all discussed in Keramati v. Schackow.3 18  The
Keramatis' child suffered a profound loss of hearing due to the alleged
medical malpractice of a doctor who failed to promptly diagnose streptococ-
cus bacteria that caused spinal meningitis. 319 The Roberts' child, born at
approximately the same time, born at the same hospital, and attended by the
partner of the doctor who attended to the Keramatis' child, was severely
retarded based upon the same alleged failure to diagnose. 320 Both families
retained Schackow and McGalliard to prosecute medical malpractice
actions.32  The attorneys filed separate civil suits, which were assigned to
314. Id.
315. Id. at 210.
316. Id. at211.
317. Id. at212.
318. 553 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989). See also Terminello v. Alman, 710
So. 2d 728 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (holding res judicata and collateral estoppel barred
second lawsuit against attorney after first case was dismissed with prejudice).
319. Id. at 743.
320. Id.
321. Id
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different judges.322 The judge overseeing the Roberts case granted the
defendants a summary judgment on statute of limitation grounds, and the
323
appellate court affirmed on appeal. The facts giving rise to the Roberts
decision were equally applicable to Keramati. The attorneys reached a
324
settlement on behalf of the Keramatis for $200,000. The Keramatis,
thereafter, filed a legal malpractice suit claiming the settlement was less than
the claims were worth because of the statute of limitation problems created
by the lawyers' untimely filing of the medical malpractice action.32
Although the trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the
attorneys on various estoppel theories, the appellate court reversed on
appeal .
The appellate court first rejected the notion that res judicata or
collateral estoppel were viable defenses. 327  "Both doctrines require the
identity of the parties or their privies to be applicable. 3 28 An additional
reason cited for rejecting the collateral estoppel argument is that the actions
and issues in the underlying case and the legal malpractice case were
"clearly not the same., 329 "In the medical malpractice case, the adequacy of
the amount settled for was not litigated, nor was the adequacy of Schackow's
and McGalliards' representation in recommending such a settlement.0
3 0
Also absent was an "equitable basis to apply those cases which hold a
party estopped in subsequent litigation to take a position inconsistent with
one taken in a prior suit involving the same party. '33' The $200,000
settlement may have been the best obtainable because of the lawyers'
negligence. Moreover, because the attorneys would be entitled to a set off
for the malpractice settlement, such settlement "appears to benefit them
more than to harm them.,
332
Holding that the Keramatis' acceptance of the settlement did not
amount to a false representation, the appellate court also rejected the
doctrine of estoppel in pais. Moreover, such a defense would in any event
create a jury issue. Furthermore, Keramati is the only reported decision in
322. Id.
323. Roberts v. Casey, 413 So. 2d 1226, 1227 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
324. Keramati, 553 So. 2d at 742.
325. Id. at 743.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 744.
328. Id.
329. Keramati, 553 So. 2d at 745.
330. Id. at 744.
331. Id. at745.
332. Id.
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Florida to squarely address the issue of whether the acceptance of a
settlement precludes suit against the attorney who negotiated such
settlement.
Collateral estoppel did not bar a claim for legal malpractice in Smith v.
Perry,334 which involved an ex-wife's claim against an attorney who
allegedly failed to properly present her loss of consortium claim in a
personal injury lawsuit brought by her ex-husband. The lawyer unsuccess-
fully claimed that the malpractice issues were previously litigated in the
divorce action.335 The court stated that collateral estoppel is applicable:
[W]here a subsequent cause of action between the same parties is
upon a different claim or demand from the first cause of action. In
such a case, the judgment of the prior action estops the parties from
litigating in the second suit issues or questions common to both
causes of action which were actually adjudicated in the prior litiga-
tion.33
6
The court determined that the issues presented in the dissolution action
would not overlap the issues in the malpractice proceeding and overturned a
contrary trial court summary judgment.
Judicial estoppel as a malpractice defense is examined in Ramsey v.
Jonassen,338 where the appellate court reversed a summary judgment in favor
of the attorney. The attorney argued at the trial court level that the client
"had waived her malpractice claim by failing to disclose that claim to the
bankruptcy court in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding she had filed before
she filed the malpractice action. 3 39 After explaining the concept of judicial
estoppel at length, the court summed up by stating "judicial estoppel is used
to prevent a party from raising a claim that should have been raised in
another action, and the failure to raise it was relied upon by a third party to
333. See also Sauer v. Flanagan & Maniotis, P.A., 748 So. 2d 1079, 1082 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (stating that failing to exercise ordinary skill and care in resolving
settlement issues did not insulate attorney from liability); Bolves v. Hullinger, 629 So. 2d 198,
200 n.2 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (citing Keramati, 553 So. 2d at 741).
334. 635 So. 2d 1019 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
335. See also Torres v. Nelson, 448 So. 2d 1058, 1060 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
(finding that malpractice action for failing to settle within insurance policy limits not barred
by prior verdict in favor of insurance company on bad faith claim).
336. Smith, 635 So. 2d at 1020 (citations omitted).
337. Id. at 1021.
338. 737 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
339. Id. at 1115.
20021
35
Trazenfeld: Legal Malpractice in Florida
Published by NSUWorks, 2002
Nova Law Review
his or her detriment. '" 34  Since the attorney was not involved in the
bankruptcy proceeding, he could not avail himself of the judicial estoppel
doctrine.
Judicial estoppel was also rejected as a defense to a malpractice claim
in Olmsted v. Emmanuel.342 The client (Olmsted) claimed that the attorneys
(appellees) could not argue in the legal malpractice action that a cause of
action under title 42, section 1981 of the United States Code would not have
been successful since the same attorneys had made a contrary argument in
the underlying case.343 The court describes the law in Florida regarding
judicial estoppel as follows:
Olmsted contends, first, .that appellees are estopped from
"claim[ing] that [his] damages in excess of $310,000 are now a
matter of 'speculation,' . . since they took a contrary position on
the matter throughout the proceedings in the Federal Court." In
other words, Olmsted maintains that, because appellees argued
throughout the federal litigation that he had a valid claim under
section 1981, they should be precluded from taking a contrary posi-
tion in their defense of this malpractice action. We are unable to
agree.
Florida recognizes the equitable doctrine of judicial estoppel,
which prevents litigants from taking totally inconsistent positions
in separate judicial proceedings to the prejudice of the adverse
party. E.g., Chase & Co. v. Little, 116 Fla. 667, 156 So. 609, 610
(1934); Ramsey v. Jonassen, 737 So.2d 1114 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999);
Dunne v. Somoano, 550 So.2d 5, 7 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). However,
in order to work an estoppel, the parties must be the same, the same
issues must be involved, and the position assumed in the former
trial must have been successfully maintained. Chase, 156 So. at
610; Ramsey, 737 So.2d at 1116. Here, appellees were not parties
in the federal litigation, and the issue of whether Olmsted had a
claim under section 1981 was never addressed on the merits in the
federal litigation. Accordingly, we conclude that appellees are not
estopped from arguing that the section 1981 claim would not have
been successful. Although there are no Florida cases directly on
340. Id. at 1116.
341. See also Berman v. Stem, 731 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999)
(reversing summary judgment in favor of client based upon judicial estoppel due to issues of
fact).
342. 783 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
343. Id. at 1125.
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point, our conclusion is supported by Shapiro v. Butler, 273
A.D.2d 657, 709 N.Y.S.2d 687, 690 (App.Div.2000), which held
that the doctrine of judicial estoppel did not bar an attorney and
law firm from arguing in their former clients' legal malpractice ac-
tion against them that the former clients would not have prevailed
in a federal civil action against the clients for alleged illegal inter-
ception and disclosure of telephone conversations where the attor-
ney and law firm had not been parties to the federal action and the
attorny's position in that action had not been adopted by the
court.
Judicial estowel prevented the client from suing his former attorney in
Monyek v. Klein. A law firm and its client embarked upon two real estate
acquisitions. After disagreements about the terms of the deal, a lawsuit
resulted involving, among other matters, a claim that the law firm and its
attorneys had breached their fiduciary duty. The trial judge ruled that the
law firm had not breached its fiduciary duty.34 Over one year later, the
client sued the law firm for negligence related to the same real estate
transactions that were the subject of the previous lawsuit. After stating that
"[u]nder the principle of estoppel by judgment, parties are estopped from
litigating in a second suit points and questions which were common to both
the first and second causes of action and which actually were adjudicated in
the prior litigation,''347 the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of
348the attorneys.
B. Comparative Negligence
Although not explicitly stated in the cases which discuss the compara-
tive negligence defense in a legal malpractice proceeding, the analysis
appears to turn on whether the client's actions contributed to his damages, in
which case the defense is viable, or whether the client is required to second
guess his attorney's advice or get a second opinion, in which case the
defense is not applicable.
A double comparative negligence situation is involved in Michael
Kovach, P.A. v. Pearce.349  The underlying proceeding in which legal
344. Id. at 1126.
345. 329 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
346. Id. at 26.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. 427 So. 2d 1128 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
20021
37
Trazenfeld: Legal Malpractice in Florida
Published by NSUWorks, 2002
Nova Law Review
malpractice allegedly occurred involved an automobile accident. When
Pearce was found to have negligently operated his vehicle, Pearce sued his
trial counsel claiming that Todter, the person who had sued Pearce, was at
fault in the accident and that Pearce's lawyer (Kovach) failed to properly
assert the comparative negligence of Todter.
Accordingly it was necessary for the jury in the malpractice action
to literally "re-try" the Todter v. Pearce case to correctly determine
Todter's negligence, if any, and Pearce's negligence, if any, caus-
ing Todter's injuries and, if both were negligent, to compare their
negligence, in order to determine how much of the $600,000 ver-
dict was properly chargeable to Pearce's negligence in injuring
Todter, how much was chargeable to Todter's own negligence, and
how much resulted from the alleged negligent failure to properly
defend. In the malpractice action, Kovach asserted as a compara-
tive negligence defense that Pearce was contributively negligent in
the defense of the Todter action.35 l
Pearce found himself having to prove a "case within a case" in the
malpractice action.
The verdict against the attorney was reversed because of an error in the
verdict form. Instead of providing the jury with the opportunity to apportion
negligence between Pearce and Kovach as to the negligent defense in the
injury case, and Todter and Pearce in the injury case, the verdict form only
allowed for apportionment of fault between Pearce and Kovach in the
malpractice action.352
Another Florida case in which the comparative negligence defense was
used is Solomon v. Meyer.353 In attempting to purchase assets from a
bankruptcy trustee, Solomon paid monies directly to the bankruptcy trustee
who did not provide the assets to Solomon. Solomon's lawsuit against the
trustee was unsuccessful. The federal court held that Solomon's own
negligence caused his loss. 354 In the malpractice action, the appellate court
could not affirm summary judgment in favor of the attorneys because
Solomon had alleged that his attorneys' advice had caused Solomon's
negligence, and genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the
350. Id. at 1129.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. 116 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
354. Id. at 38.
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damages were caused by advice provided by the attorneys or the acts of the
bankruptcy trustee.355
The Fourth District Court of Appeal ignored both Kovach and Solomon
356in Tarleton v. Arnstein & Lehr, when it boldly stated "[a] client cannot be
found to be comparatively negligent for relying on an attorney's erroneous
legal advice or for failing to correct errors of the attorney which involve the
exercise of professional expertise.' Thus, the appellate court found that
the trial court erred in failing to issue a directed verdict in favor of the client
on the issue of comparative negligence. The law firm had argued that the
client was sophisticated in matters of business and should have seen the error
of her attorney's actions in advising her to sign a settlement agreement that
served to waive a cause of action regarding certain promissory notes.
"Simply because she was somewhat sophisticated in business matters does
not impose upon her the burden to second guess her attorney's advice or to
hire a second attorney to see if such advice was proper.",
358
C. In Pari Delicto and Fraud
In Turner v. Anderson,359 which was a case of first impression in
Florida, the Fourth District labored to answer "[tihe question of whether a
client who does an illegal act on advice of counsel can sue counsel for
damages resulting therefrom."360 After examining cases from other
jurisdictions, the court held that "no public policy should allow appellant to
recover damages as a result of engaging in criminal conduct such as occurred
in this case."36' The court considered the appellant's sophisticated
background and his deposition testimony in which he admitted committing
perjury with full knowledge of his conduct. What the court did not decide is
more telling. "We need not decide whether the doctrine of in pari delicto is
a bar where the client's misconduct is far less in degree than counsel's...
nor need we decide whether the client can recover fees paid to counsel,
because this is not part of appellant's claim. 362
355. Id. at 38-39.
356. 719 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
357. Id. at 331 (citations to Oregon and California cases omitted).
358. Id.
359. 704 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
360. Id. at 750.
361. Id. at 751.
362. Id.
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False and inconsistent information provided during discovery resulted
in a legal malpractice case being dismissed with prejudice in Cox v. Burke."'
The former client sued her attorneys after being informed the day after the
statute of limitations had expired that they were not going to handle her
medical malpractice case. 364 During the course of the malpractice litigation,
and after a year of discovery, the defendant attorneys were able to prove that
the former client had misled them about her identity, driver's license history,
365social security numbers, and prior injuries. The court found that a clear
showing of "false or misleading answers in sworn discovery that either
appear calculated to evade or stymy discovery on issues central to her
case ' 366 justified dismissal. It is interesting to note that the appellate court
deferred to the trial court's "discretion to fashion the apt remedy" 367 but
suggested that it "might have imposed a lesser sanction."
3 6
D. Statute of Limitations
1. Background
A lawsuit against an attorney for professional malpractice, with whom
the client has privity,369 must be commenced within two years from the time
the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered with the
exercise of due diligence.370 The applicable statute reads as follows:
Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be com-
menced as follows:
(4) WITHIN TWO YEARS -
363. 706 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
364. Id. at 44.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 47.
367. Id.
368. Cox, 706 So. 2d at 47.
369. Hickey v. Dunn & Corey, 761 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 3d Dist, Ct. App. 2000) (holding
that since a member of a pre-paid legal services plan was not in privity with attorney, four-
year rather than two-year statute of limitations applied).
370. FLA. STAr. § 95.11(4) (2001); Abbott v. Friedsam, 682 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1996) (reversing summary judgment because affidavits did not conclusively show
when plaintiffs knew or should have known that they had a cause of action to trigger the
running of the statute of limitations).
[Vol. 27:85
40
Nova Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 5
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol27/iss1/5
Trazenfeld
(a) An action for professional malpractice, other than medical
malpractice, whether founded on contract or tort; provided
that the period of limitations shall run from the time the
cause of action is discovered or should have been discov-
ered with the exercise of due diligence. However, the limi-
tation of actions herein for professional malpractice shall be
limited to persons in privity with the professional.
371
The difficult question is when the two-year period begins.372 In Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Lane,373 the Supreme Court of Florida
analogized the accrual of a cause of action for legal malpractice to the
accrual of a cause of action against accountants. 374 "A clear majority of the
district courts have expressly held that a cause of action for legal malpractice
does not accrue until the underlying legal proceeding has been completed on
appellate review because, until that time, one cannot determine if there was
any actionable error by the attorney. 3 75  The court wanted to avoid the
quandary that would require a party to file a malpractice proceeding against
a professional claiming negligence while taking a totally inconsistent
position during an appeal by alleging that the attorney was correct and a
lower court's ruling was incorrect. The Peat case holds that the cause of
action does not begin to accrue until the injured party knew or should have
known of the "redressable harm or injury. 376 When the client knew or
should have known of the attorney's negligence is a question of fact not
ordinarily capable of determination on summary judgment.377 However, if a
client incurs the expense of having to defend a lawsuit that should have been
settled, except for the attorney's malpractice, the accrual of the cause of
action begins at that time, not, as urged by the client in Breakers of Fort
371. § 95.11-.11(4)(a).
372. Rosa v. Roth, 442 So. 2d 323 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (reversing summary
judgment in favor or attorney because issue of fact existed as to when client should have
discovered malpractice).
373. 565 So. 2d 1323 (Fla. 1990).
374. Id. at 1325.
375. Id.; see also Ramsey v. Jonassen, 737 So. 2d 1114, 1115 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1999).
376. Lane, 565 So. 2d at 1325.
377. Freel v. Fleming, 489 So. 2d 1209 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that
affidavit provided by client in trying to set aside a default judgment did not establish client
knew a cause of action had accrued against lawyer who allowed default to be entered); Green
v. Bartel, 365 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that when client discovered
wrongful act is a question of fact).
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Lauderdale, Ltd. v. Cassel,378 when damages were paid to the claimant on
the lawsuit that should have been settled.
The earlier case of Sawyer v. Earle379 was disapproved to the extent it
conflicted with Peat. In Sawyer, the Second District Court of Appeal held
that the statute of limitations had been tolled notwithstanding that the
claimant was unable to "determine his exact amount or full extent of
damages ' '380 at the time the statute would have expired. The difference
between the two cases turns on the fact that in Peat the client maintained
that its legal position was correct until after the United States Tax Court had
ruled against such position, while in Sawyer, the client believed his
representation to be improper when he discharged his first lawyer, which
was well within the two-year period.
The clients in Spivey v. Trader 38 retained an attorney who advised
them that transferring certain assets owned as tenants by the entireties to a
corporation would not place such assets at risk in a pending personal injury
action.382  A judgment was rendered in supplemental proceedings to the
personal injury action finding such assets subject to attachment contrary to
the attorney's advice.383 The Spivey court, relying upon Peat, held that the
two-year countdown began when the judgment on the supplemental
proceedings was rendered, not when the client suspected that the attorney's
advice was wrong. This was because the client had "vigorously contested
the fact that the real estate, or his interest therein, was subject to attachment
in the personal injury action filed against him personally."3 84
Since 1989, the Florida courts have been attempting to refine a rule of
accrual applicable to transactional and litigational malpractice.
2. Transactional Malpractice
In the area of transactional malpractice, Peat was further analyzed in
Throneburg v. Boose, Casey, Ciklin, Lubitz, Martens, McBane & O'Connell,
378. 528 So. 2d 985 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988), overruled in part by Freemont
Indemnity Co. v. Carey, Dwyer, Eckhart, Mason & Spring, P.A., 796 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 2001).
379. 541 So. 2d 1232 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
380. Id. at 1234.
381. 620 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
382. Id. at 213.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 215.
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P.A.,385 in which a dismissal based upon the statute of limitations having
expired was reversed. The Throneburg court stated:
We understand Peat Marwick to draw a distinction between
knowledge of actual harm from legal malpractice and knowledge of
potential harm. The former begins the limitations period; the latter
does not. Legal services, like accounting services, are often subject
to differing views among practitioners. Lawyers often disagree with
one another on the same transaction. It seems clear to us that Peat
Marwick, properly understood, means that the limitations period on
claims of legal malpractice should not commence until it is rea-
sonably clear that the client has actually suffered some damage
from legal advice or services.
386
Based upon the court's view of Peat, the filing of the lawsuit against
the attorney in Throneburg more than two years after the real estate
document in question was prepared, but less than two years after a decision
holding the document to be invalid, was deemed to have been timely filed.
The preparation of a Florida postnuptial agreement was deemed
387transactional in Robbat v. Gordon. After reviewing Peat and Throneberg,
the court stated:
Read together, Peat, Marwick and Throneberg stand for the propo-
sition that knowledge of an adverse decision by a lower tribunal is
not sufficient to start the running of the statute of limitations in a
transactional malpractice claim where the client chooses to defend
the actions of the defendant on appeal, since to require the client to
pursue the malpractice claim while at the same time defending the
professional's actions on appeal would place the client "in the
wholly untenable position of having to take directly contrary posi-
tions in [the] two actions." 388
It was not until after the litigation involving the postnuptial agreement was
resolved that the statute of limitations began to run against the attorney who
provided advice regarding the post-nuptial.
385. 659 So. 2d 1134 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
386. Id. at 1136 (emphasis added).
387. 771 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
388. Robbat. 771 So. 2d at 636-37.
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3. Litigational Malpractice
The process of refining the accrual rule has been fraught with difficulty.
A practical review of the difficulty in determining when the statute of
limitations begins to run is set forth in the dissenting opinion in Silvestrone
v. Edell.389 "Unfortunately, in practice it is unclear in Florida case law
exactly when the statute of limitations begins to run in attorney malpractice
cases." 39° The majority opinion in the Fifth District's decision in Silvestrone
found that the statute begins to run before a final judgment is rendered. 39'
Due to various post trial motions, including the amount of attorney's fees
owed to the attorney for the prevailing party who later sued the attorney,
approximately two years expired between the return of the jury verdict in the
392
underlying federal antitrust action and the final judgment. The case turned
on the fact that the client had instructed his attorney not to appeal the jury
verdict, to request a new trial, or to seek additur.393 Thus, the court found
that the client "had all the information necessary to establish his cause of
action ' 394 when the jury returned its verdict. An alternative argument that
the cause of action should be tolled under the continuing representation
doctrine was not considered because it was not presented below, although
the court found that the argument had some "appeal. 395
In contrast to Silvestrone, the statute of limitations did not commence
until the day after the court rendered final judgment in Zakak v. Broida and
Napier, P.A.396 The court ordered the Zakaks to perform according to the
settlement made by their attorney despite the Zakaks' protest that the
attorney was not authorized to enter into such settlement.397 When they
refused to pay, the court ordered settlement and entered a final judgment
against them.198 The Zakaks initiated a legal malpractice suit within two
389. 701 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997), vacated by 721 So. 2d 1173 (Fla.
1998).
390. Id. at 94.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Silvestrone, 701 So. 2d at 91. See also Eldred v. Reber, 639 So. 2d 1086 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (holding statute of limitations began to run when opinion, not mandate,
was issued by appellate court).
395. Id. at 91-92; see infra the section on Resurrecting, Delaying & Tolling the Statute
of Limitations for a discussion of that doctrine.
396. 545 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
397. Id. at 381.
398. Id.
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years of the judgment, but more than two years after the order enforcing the
settlement.
In recognition of the conflict with Zakak, the Supreme Court of Florida
accepted Silvestrone v. Edell4w for review "on the issue of whether the two-
year statute of limitations for legal malpractice, in a litigation context, begins
to run when the verdict is rendered or when final judgment is entered." In
Silvestrone, the Supreme Court of Florida attempted to create a "bright line
rule"402 in order to "provide certainty and reduce litigation over when the
statute starts to run. 4°3  Since the law was "not clear as to when the
limitations period for legal malpractice, in a litigation-related context, begins
to run."404
The Supreme Court of Florida held in Silvestrone that there is a "bright
line" rule that requires commencement of a cause of action for litigation
legal malpractice within two years of the final conclusion of the underlying
litigation.40 5 The court held that the statute of limitations begins to run when
the final judgment becomes final.4°6 The Supreme Court of Florida did not
address the knowledge of harm as required by the statute. A review of the
facts from the Fifth District's opinion indicates "[t]here is no question that
Mr. Silvestrone knew about the alleged malpractice when the jury returned
an unsatisfactory verdict." 7 Thus, the client knew about the malpractice at
the time judgment became final. In footnote two of the Silvestrone decision,
the court distinguished Birnholz v. Blake408 because it involved transactional
malpractice.
Unlike the client in Silvestrone, the client in Pinkerton v. West 4  first
learned of her attorney's misadvice more than two years later from a
399. Id.
400. 721 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 1998).
401. Id. at 1174.
402. Id. at 1176.
403. Id.
404. Id. at 1175.
405. Silvestrone, 721 So. 2d at 1175-76.
406. See Slapikas v. Llorente, 766 So. 2d 440, 441 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000)
(applying Silvestrone to determine if attorney's fees were properly awarded); Gaines V. Russo,
723 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (reversing a dismissal in reliance upon
Silvestrone); Hold v. Manzini, 736 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (holding
redressable harm cannot be established until an adverse final judgment has been rendered
against the client).
407. Silvestrone, 701 So. 2d at 91.
408. 399 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
409. 353 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
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California attorney. 4'° The attorney successfully argued before the trial
court that the statute of limitations had expired because the former client had
read an article contrary to the Florida lawyer's advice and wrote letters to the
attorney questioning his conduct more than two years before suit was
filed.4' In reversing the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the
attorney, Schetter v. Jordan,412 was cited for the following proposition:
The applicability of the statute of limitations to the plaintiffs' cause
of action for malpractice against the attorney-defendant is depend-
ent upon when the attorney's alleged act of negligence became
known to the client which matter is a question of fact to be deter-
mined by the trier of fact and not by the court in a summary pro-
ceeding.
413
Unlike a literal reading of the Supreme Court of Florida's decision in
Silvestrone, which ignores the statutory requirement of knowledge by the
client that the attorney committed malpractice, the Schetter approach is
consistent with the requirements of the statute.41 4
The Third District Court of Appeal, in Watkins v. Gilbride Heller &
Brown, P.A.,415 overturned the trial court's ruling that the statute of
limitations commenced after the district court of appeal's ruling was final,
rather than after any attempt to seek supreme court review was final. "[A]
final judgment is not final until a timely filed appeal to, or petition for• • ,,416
review by, the supreme court is resolved. However, due to the "recent
nature of Silvestrone and the rapid dispute over the bright line rule' 417 the
following question was certified to the Supreme Court of Florida:
WHERE REVIEW OF A DISTRICT COURT DECISION IN AN
ACTION UNDERLYING A LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIM IS
SOUGHT IN THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT, DOES THE
TWO-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PERIOD OF
SECTION 95.1l(4)(A), FLORIDA STATUTES, BEGIN TO RUN
FROM THE DATE THE DECISION BECOMES FINAL BY
410. Id.
411. Id. at 103.
412. 294 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
413. Id. at 131.
414. Id.
415. 754 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
416. Id. at 762.
417. Id. at 763.
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THE SUPREME COURT'S RESOLUTION OF THAT REVIEW,
OR DOES THE PERIOD RUN FROM THE DATE OF THE
DISTRICT COURT'S MANDATE?
18
Judge Sorondo's concurring opinion in Watkins emphasizes the
importance of exercising caution in applying the statute of limitations
defense:
The statute of limitations is an onerous defense which should be
limited in its application to those cases where its applicability is
unavoidable. See Pezzi v. Brown, 697 So. 2d 883, 886 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1997) ("statutes restricting access to the courts must be nar-
rowly construed in a manner favoring access."); Angrand v. Fox,
552 So. 2d 1113, 1116 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) ("it is well established
that a limitations defense is not favored, ... and that therefore any
substantial doubt on the question should be resolved by choosing
the longer rather than the shorter possible statutory period."). This
Court has historically emphasized that "Florida policy dictates a
strong preference that cases be decided on their merits." City of
Miami v. Rivas, 723 So. 2d 393, 393 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Venero
v. Balbuena, 652 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); Cinkat Transp.,
Inc. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 596 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992).
Where courts have discretion in determining the applicability of a
statute of limitations, such discretion should be exercised in favor
of affording the Florida Constitution's guarantee of access to courts
contained within Article I, Section 21.
The Supreme Court of Florida accepted review of Watkins,42 ° approved the
Third District Court of Appeal's ruling, and held "the statute of limitations
begins to run from the date the decision becomes final by this Court's
resolution of the case.
' 42
'
A transactional malpractice case that resulted in the client's litigation
with a third party ultimately puts the accrual of the cause of action, the
running of the statute of limitations, and five of the cases on the issues into
perspective. Taracido v. Perez-Abreu, Zamora & De La Fe, P.A. ,422
involved an allegedly improperly prepared contract for sale of corporate
418. Id.
419. Id. (Sorondo, J., concurring).
420. Watkins, 783 So. 2d at 225.
421. Id.
422. 705 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
20021
47
Trazenfeld: Legal Malpractice in Florida
Published by NSUWorks, 2002
Nova Law Review
stock that later became the subject of litigation.423 The client filed the
malpractice suit within two years of the settlement of the litigation with the
third party.424 In reversing a summary judgment in favor of the attorneys, the
court stated:
The existence of legal malpractice is often difficult to ascertain. A
client should not be placed in the position of having to file a poten-
tially baseless claim prematurely fearing that otherwise an action
will be precluded by the statute of limitations. Thus we hold that a
cause of action for legal malpractice based upon a prior transaction
accrues at the conclusion of subsequent litigation between the cli-
ent and a third party.425
Taracido was accepted for review by the Supreme Court of Florida due
426to conflict with Edwards v. Ford, although Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
42702
v. Lane found Edwards to be "clearly distinguishable. 428 In Edwards, the
law firm had drafted a contract for its clients and a third party that was later
asserted by the third party to be usurious. 429 The drafter allegedly agreed on
behalf of the law firm, sometime during 1963, to undertake corrective
measures without charge.430 The client filed the malpractice suit in 1968, in
response to a suit by the law firm, to recover its unpaid attorneys fees.4 3'
The client was unsuccessful as a result of the court's holding that the statute
432of limitations had expired. 3 The Edwards court quoted at length from the
case of Downing v. Vaine,433 in holding that "the event which triggers the
running of the statute of limitations is notice to or knowledge by the injured
party that a cause of action has accrued in his favor, and not the date on
which the negligent act which caused the damages was actually commit-
ted.' 4 3  The damages incurred in Edwards were only minimal at the time
their cause of action accrued.435
423. Id. at 42.
424. Id.
425. Id. at 43 (citations omitted).
426. 279 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 1973).
427. 565 So. 2d 1323 (Fla. 1990).
428. Id. at 1327.
429. Edwards, 279 So. 2d at 851.
430. Id.
431. Id. at 852.
432. Id.
433. 228 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
434. Edwards, 279 So. 2d at 853; see Zakak v. Broida & Napier, P.A., 545 So. 2d 380
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Diaz v. Piquette, 496 So. 2d 239, 240 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
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The Supreme Court of Florida in Perez-Abreu, Zamora & De La Fe,
P.A. v. Taracido43 approved the Third District Court of Appeal's decision
and receded from Edwards.437
Consistent with Peat, Marwick, we hold that, in the circumstances
presented here, a negligence/malpractice cause of action accrues
when the client incurs damages at the conclusion of the related or
underlying judicial proceedings or, if there are no related or under-
lying judicial proceedings, when the client's right to sue in the re-
lated or underlying proceeding expires. If a negligence/malpractice
action is filed prior to the time that a client's right to sue in the re-
lated or underlying judicial proceeding has expired, or if a negli-
gence/malpractice action is filed during the time that a related or
underlying judicial proceeding is ongoing, then the defense can
move for an abatement or stay of the claim on the ground that the
negligence/malpractice action has not yet accrued. The moving
party will have the burden of demonstrating that the related or un-
derlying judicial proceeding will determine whether damages were
incurred which are causally related to the alleged negli-
gence/malpractice. The determination of this will be for the trial
court. Similarly, if a party raises an affirmative defense that a neg-
ligence/malpractice action has expired, the party bringing the ac-
tion may file a reply asserting the avoidance of the statute of limita-
tions due to a related or underlying judicial proceeding.438
The court in Taracido held that "even though the related or underlying
judicial proceeding was not complete until 1967, the cause of action accrued
in 1963, and therefore the statute of limitations began to run at that time.,
439
The Supreme Court of Florida tied together the previous three most
significant cases dealing with the statute of limitations by stating,
"[m]oreover, this Court's decisions in Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v.
Lane, Silvestrone v. Edell, and Blumberg were intended to: (1) provide
certainty and reduce litigation over when the statute starts to run and (2)
1986); Richards Enter., Inc. v. Swofford, 495 So. 2d 1210, 1212 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1986), cause dismissed, 515 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1987).
435. Edwards, 279 So. 2d at 853.
436. 790 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 2001).
437. Id.
438. Id. at 1054 (citing Blumberg v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 790 So. 2d 1061, 1065 (Fla.
2001)).
439. Taracido, 790 So. 2d at 1054.
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prevent clients from having to take directly contrary positions in the two
actions. ' 'm °
4. Resurrecting, Delaying, & Tolling the Statute of Limitations
The appellate courts have disagreed as to whether an otherwise time-
barred action for legal malpractice may be resurrected as a counterclaim to
an action by the attorney against the former client to collect attorneys fees.
The First District Court of Appeal allowed affirmative relief against the
attorney in the guise of recoupment in Cherney v. Moody.44 ' However, in
non-legal malpractice cases, two other decisions only allow recoupment to
be used defensively as a set off rather than offensively as a counter claim. 442
An attorney who misleads his client as to his ability to cure a known
problem may also extend the time period in which a lawsuit may be brought.
In Burnside v. McCrary,"3 the attorney reassured the client that the attorn
could cure the dismissal of the client's cause of action by filing motions.
The court found that the claim of the attorney's reassurances was sufficient
to create an issue of material fact as to whether the malpractice action had
yet accrued.44 5 No such question as to the accrual of the cause of action was
evident in Howard v. Minnesota Muskies, Inc.446 Several years before he
filed the malpractice suit, the client learned that a judgment had been entered
against him allegedly because of his attorney's withdrawal from the case
without the client's knowledge or consent. " 7 The appellate court affirmed
the summary judgment in favor of the attorney."8
In a legal malpractice case, the statute of limitations does not
commence until after the attorney no longer represents the aggrieved client.
In Wilder v. Meyer,449 the court explained Florida's continuing representa-
tion doctrine:
440. Id. (internal citations omitted).
441. 413 So. 2d 866, 869 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
442. Allie v. Ionata, 503 So. 2d 1237, 1242 (Fla. 1987) (stating no affirmative right of
recovery, whether by recoupment or setoff, once it is barred by statute of limitations); Horace
Mann Ins. Co. v. DeMirza, 312 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
443. 382 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
444. Id.
445. Id. at 76; accord Smith v. Hussey, 363 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
446. 420 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
447. Id. at 653.
448. Id.
449. 779 F. Supp. 164 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
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The Plaintiffs negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims are
governed by a two-year statute of limitations applicable to profes-
sional malpractice claims. This two-year statute of limitations be-
gins to run from the date the cause of action is discovered or should
have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence.
However, this two-year statute of limitations is subject to the con-
tinuing representation doctrine. The continuing representation tolls
the statute of limitations as long as the attorney continues to repre-
sent the client.450
The Second District has confirmed the federal district court's
understanding of Florida law: "we note that in Florida the statute of
limitations for legal malpractice generally does not begin to run while the
attorney continues to represent the client."
45
'
"The continuing representation [doctrine] tolls the statute of limitations
as long as the attorney continues to represent the client. 4 52 The attorney-
defendant in Wilder provided advice on tax issues through the date of filing
suit.453 Therefore, the suit was timely filed.454 The impact of Silvestrone v.
Edell,455 holding that a litigation legal malpractice case must be commenced
within two years of the judgment becoming final, upon the continuous
.... 456
representation doctrine, is uncertain. It is unclear if the statute of
limitations is to be extended if an attorney were to continue to represent the
client more than two years after the final judgment becomes final.
The issue for determination in Garrido v. Markus, Winter & Spitale
Law Firm,457 was "whether the amended complaint relates back to the
original complaint so as to toll the statute of limitations. 458 The former
client sought to amend the legal malpractice complaint to add individual
partners of a law partnership after the statute of limitations had expired
against the individual partners.459 In finding that the statute of limitations
450. Id. at 169 (quoting Bimholz v. Blake, 399 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1981) (citations omitted)).
451. Abbott v. Friedsam, 682 So. 2d 597, 599 n. 1 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
452. Wilder, 779 F. Supp. at 169 (quoting Birnholz, 399 So. 2d at 375).
453. Id.
454. Id.
455. 721 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 1998).
456. Id. at 1175.
457. 358 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
458. Id. at 579.
459. Id. at 578.
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barred the addition of the individual partners, the court stated that the
general rule for "relation back" of party defendants as follows:
"Corporations, partnerships, associations or individuals. Gener-
ally, whether an aniendmentof process or pleading, or both, will be
allowed which changes the description or characterization of a
party after the statute of limitations has run, from a corporation to
an individual, partnership, or other association, or vice versa,
seems to depend upon whether the misdescription or mischaracteri-
zation is interpreted as merely a misnomer or defect in the descrip-
tion or characterization, or whether it is deemed a substitution or
entire change of parties; in the former case an amendment will be
held to relate back to the commencement of the action, while in the
latter the amendment will be held to amount to the institution of a
new action. ' ' N
The court noted "a total absence of covert behavior" on the part of the
lawyers as to who the proper parties were and implied that such conduct
would have altered the result in the case.46' Under any circumstances, "[i]f
the face of the complaint does not show the cause is time barred, but the
defendant wishes to challenge the suit on that basis, the defendant must raise
the affirmative defense of statute of limitations in his answer.
4 62
5. The Premature Legal Malpractice Suit
The premature filing of a legal malpractice suit occurred in Zuckerman
v. Ruden, Barnett, McCloskey, Smith, Schuster & Russell, P.A.4 3 The law
firm had prepared a mortgage on which the client had to foreclose.4
However, the borrower contested the validity of the mortgage because the
property was homestead property and the wife did not join in the mort-
gage.46' The foreclosure proceeding was ongoing when the client filed a
legal malpractice suit.4 The appellate court reversed a summary judgment
460. Id. at 581 (quoting 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation ofActions § 295 (1970)).
461. Id. at 580.
462. Jelenc v. Draper, 678 So. 2d 917, 919 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (citations
omitted).
463. 670 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
464. Id. at 1051.
465. Id.
466. Id.
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in favor of the attorneys premised upon the client's knowledge of the
potential defect more than two years before suit was filed.4 7
Here, unless Zuckerman is unable to foreclose on the mortgage, he
will not have suffered damages proximately caused by Ruden Bar-
nett's alleged failure to obtain the wife's signature on the mortgage.
Only when the foreclosure action has been entirely resolved will
468the statute of limitations on the malpractice action begin to run.
The filing of a legal malpractice suit was also found to be premature in
Bierman v. Miller,469 resulting in a stay until the underlying federal case was
finalized. 470 Miller sued his former lawyer, Bierman, during the pendency of
a lawsuit brought against Miller by a corporation with whom he had entered
into a severance agreement containing a covenant not to sue.471 The
corporation claimed the severance agreement was unenforceable because of
Miller's fraud, which induced the corporation to sign the severance
472
agreement. The viability of the severance agreement had not been
determined at the time Miller brought suit against his former attorney in
which he claimed that Bierman's negligence in drafting the severance
agreement permitted the corporation to sue him resulting in considerable
attorneys fees. 473 "Until the validity of the agreement is decided in federal
court there can be no determination in the malpractice action as to whether
Bierman was negligent in negotiating and drafting that agreement. 474 In
Greenberg, Traurig, Hoffman, Lipoff, Rosen & Quentel, P.A., v. Sun NLF
Ltd. , the client was also deemed to have been premature in having a stay
lifted prior to the resolution of the pending unjust enrichment action upon
476which the malpractice was based.
When there is a concern about the expiration of a statute of limitations,
a practical safety net is to enter into a tolling agreement with the potentially
467. Id.
468. Zuckerman, 670 So. 2d at 1051 (citations omitted).
469. 639 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994). See also Miller v. Lindback Constr.
Corp., 782 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (legal malpractice action severed and
abated, determination of redressable harm was premature).
470. Bierman v. Miller, 639 So. 2d 627, 628 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
471. Id. at 627.
472. Id. at 628.
473. Id.
474. Id.
475. 719 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
476. Id.
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culpable attorney in which the parties agree that the statute of limitations
will not commence until a certain date. Alternatively, as suggested in
Birnholz v. Blake,477 the malpractice action can be stayed pending a
resolution of the claim giving rise to the malpractice action. 478 Dismissing
the malpractice complaint until the underlying case is resolved was found to
be an error in Bartlett v. Bennett.
479
E. Abandonment
"The circumstances in which a client's subsequent actions constitute an
abandonment of a legal malpractice claim, as a matter of law, are very
narrow. '' 8° A summary judgment in favor of an attorney was overturned in
Lenahan v. Russell L. Forkey, P.A., holding that the dismissal of a lawsuit in
Virginia did not preclude a malpractice suit in Florida.48' However, the
court stated that if proof of the viability of the Virginia lawsuit, independent
of the actions of the attorney in Florida, were sufficiently established, then
"the voluntary dismissal of the Virginia lawsuit may very well constitute an
intervening superseding cause.,
482
Abandonment can occur when the client settles the underlying action
while the malpractice action is pending. In Pennsylvania Insurance
483Guarantee Ass'n v. Sikes, an insurance company, which hired an attorney
to defend a client in a personal injury case, sued the attorney that it had hired
for malpractice, and then settled the personal injury case rather than appeal a
loss deemed to have been caused by judicial error, which "in all likelihood"
would have been corrected on appeal.484  Accordingly, the summary
judgment in favor of the attorney was affirmed. 485 "We hold, on the facts of
this case, that the settlement of the underlying personal injury case, while the
477. 399 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
478. A judicial stay was imposed upon the legal malpractice claims in Watts v. Buck
because the right to maintain the suit was suspended due to the plaintiffs status as a felon.
454 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
479. 360 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
480. Lenahan v. Russell L. Forkey, P.A., 702 So. 2d 610, 611 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1997).
481. Id. at 612.
482. Id.
483. 590 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991). Accord Bradley v. Davis, 777 So.
2d 1189 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
484. Sikes, 590 So. 2d at 1053.
485. Id.
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appeal was pending, constituted an abandonment of any claim that PIGA's
loss resulted from legal malpractice rather than judicial error., 4s6
Although not cited in Sikes, the Third District dealt with a similar issue
487two years before in Oteiza v. Braxton. Oteiza involved a summary
judgment in favor of an attorney who had been sued by his former doctor
client for failing to perfect an appeal of a final order by the Board of Medical
488Examiners. The standard for not timely filing an appeal was explained as
follows:
In order to recover damages for legal malpractice, a party who has
been denied his right to appeal due to an attorney's failure to timely
file a petition for review to the appropriate court must show that
but for the attorney's negligence, the appeal most probably would
have been successful.4 9
After examining what would have been the appellate issue, the Oteiza court
reversed the summary judgment holding that "but for the attorney's
negligence, the appeal most probably would have been successful. ' '490
The Third District, in Segall v. Segall,491 helped to clarify when a client
must file an appeal in order to perfect a later malpractice case, but it did not
adopt a bright line test.
Our cases should not be read to require every party who suffers a
loss and attributes that loss to legal malpractice to obtain a final
appellate determination of the underlying case before asserting a
claim for legal malpractice. The test for determining when a cause
of action for attorney malpractice arises remains when "the exist-
ence of redressable harm has been established." Diaz v. Piquete,
496 So.2d 239, 240 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), rev. denied, 506 So.2d
1042 (Fla. 1987). In some cases, redressable harm caused by errors
in the course of litigation can only be determined upon completion
of the appellate process. See Sikes, 590 So.2d at 1053. In other
cases, the failure to obtain appellate review should not bar an ac-
tion for malpractice. See, e.g., Zitrin, 621 So.2d 748 (where attor-
ney failed to include requested provisions in employment contract,
malpractice plaintiff not required to confirm attorney's error on ap-
486. Id.
487. 547 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
488. Id. at 949.
489. Id. (citations omitted).
490. Id. at 950.
491. 632 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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peal); Breakers of Fort Lauderdale, Ltd. v. Cassel, 528 So.2d 985
(Fla. 3d DCA 1988)(when attorney improperly failed to consum-
mate settlement of lawsuit, cause of action for legal malpractice ac-
crued when client learned that lawsuit was revived). We are unable
to establish a bright-line rule that complete appellate review of the
underlying litigation is a condition precedent to every legal mal-
practice action. To do so would, in many cases, violate the tenet
that the law will not require the performance of useless acts.492
Segall was somewhat unusual in that the court dismissed the appeal of
the underlying jury verdict for the plaintiff's failure to comply with
discovery orders.493  The deemed waiver of the malpractice case was
predicated upon the conduct that led to the appeal being dismissed which
"foreclosed any determination that judicial error rather than attorney
malpractice caused their loss in the underlying litigation.
' 494
The abandonment defense was narrowly construed in Parker v. Graham
& James.495 The malpractice plaintiffs had retained Graham & James to
prosecute a federal suit for crop loss. The verdict form in the federal suit
required the jury to itemize the damages under theories of contract,
negligence, and strict liability. The jury awarded $50,000 on the contract and
negligence theories and $6,800,000 on strict liability. The Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals remanded for a new trial on damages because of the
discrepancies in the verdict.496 The plaintiffs discharged Graham & Jones
and settled for $4,000,000. The clients sued Graham & Jones for malprac-
tice and sought damages for the attorneys' failure to submit a general verdict
form that requested a single damage amount on all three theories and for
failure to seek prejudgment interest. The trial court dismissed the case with
prejudice on the notion that the plaintiffs had abandoned their legal
malpractice suit when they settled the underlying case.
The Third District reversed the trial court since "the settlement did not
thwart any review process which could have cured the malpractice ....
After issuance of the Overseas Private Investment opinion, anything further
that plaintiffs could have done would only have served to mitigate their
damages. 497 Only considerations of appeal were viewed in this abandon-
492. Id. at 78.
493. Segall v. Downtown Assocs., 546 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
494. Segall, 632 So. 2d at 78.
495. 715 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
496. See Overseas Private Inv. Corp. v. Metro. Dade County, 47 F.3d 1111 (11th Cir.
1995).
497. Parker, 715 So. 2d at 1048.
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ment analysis. The plaintiffs were not required to retry the case and obtain
the same, or even a larger verdict, than the first trial in order to avoid the
abandonment defense. Seemingly, the attorney-defendants would be able to
claim that no damages would have been suffered if a second trial had
occurred.
The directed verdict, based upon the abandonment defense, was
reversed in favor of the law firm in Hunzinger Construction Corp. v.
Quarles & Brady.498 Before an appeal was completed, Hunzinger settled the
underlying case in which the trial court held that a mechanic's lien was filed
late. During the malpractice case, the attorneys argued that the client could
not proceed on a malpractice claim because Hunzinger had not completed
the appeal. However, the client was successful because the appellate court
could not "say, as the court could in Sikes, that the mistake in the original
proceedings would 'in all likelihood' have been corrected on appeal.
In Eastman v. Flor-Ohio, Ltd.,500 the law firm urged the court to expand
the abandonment defense to require the filing and prosecution of an appeal
before filing a legal malpractice case based upon negligence occurring in the
underlying case. The following three policy reasons were set forth for not
extending the abandonment theory as requested:
Perhaps the least compelling reason is the negative effect such a
ruling would have on the work load of the appellate courts ....
[S]uch a ruling would also discourage parties from settling pending
appeals and would be inconsistent with the party's legal duty to
mitigate their damages .... A more important reason is that such a
ruling would require litigants to spend yet more of their resources
prosecuting an appeal to judicial conclusion even though they may
disagree with the theory of the appeal they would be required to
maintain. 5
0
IX. COLLECrBIlTY
The collectibility of the judgment that would have been recovered in the
underlying action may be an issue depending upon the circumstances. The
498. 735 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 4th Dist Ct. App. 1999). See also Coble v. Aronson, 647 So.
2d 968 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (reversing summary judgment since malpractice cause of
action was not eliminated by settlement of related lawsuit against third party).
499. Hunzinger Constr. Corp., 735 So. 2d at 595.
500. 744 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
501. Id. at 504.
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attorney who filed suit in Fernandes v. Barrs5°2 failed to do so in a timely
fashion against Lake Community College for personal injuries Sustained by
his client at the college campus. After an award of $398,670 rendered at the
conclusion of a bench trial, the attorney appealed claiming, in part, that
damages were limited by section 768.28 of the Florida Statutes, which caps
damages against state agencies at $100,000. The court indicated the "general
rule is that the client/plaintiff in a legal malpractice action must prove both
that a favorable result would have been achieved in the underlying litigation
but for the negligence of the attorney/defendant and that any judgment which
could have been recovered would have been collectible. 50 3  The policy
reason for this general rule is to prevent "a windfall to the client by
preventing him from recovering more from the attorney than he could have
actually obtained from the tortfeasor in the underlying action.
"The plaintiff may ordinarily satisfy this burden with evidence of the
original tortfeasor's financial status, insurance coverage, property owner-
ship, and so forth if such evidence can be obtained.",595 If such evidence
cannot be obtained because the negligence of the attorney makes it
impossible, then the burden shifts to the attorney to prove that the judgment
or any portion thereof was uncollectible.
X. IMMUNITY
In some situations, an attorney is immune to a malpractice suit by his
client. This is exemplified where an attorney represents the Department of
Revenue as a program attorney in child support proceedings and where an
attorney represents union members at the behest of a labor union. Mensh
and Macintosh, P.A. represented the Department of Revenue as program
attorneys in a child support proceeding for Donna Hand.5° Hand later sued
the law firm for malpractice in a complaint that alleged "many facts which
would be sufficient to support an action for negligence. 50 7 The case was
502. 641 So. 2d 1371 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994) disapproved by Chandris, S.A. v.
Yanakakis, 668 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1995).
503. Id. at 1375 (citing Hand v. Hustad, 440 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983))
(reversing directed verdict in favor of defendant-attorney because plaintiff had offered
sufficient evidence of collectibility to present a jury question).
504. Id. at 1376.
505. Id.
506. Hand v. Mensh & Macintosh, P.A., 718 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
507. Id. at 235.
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dismissed with prejudice because of the immunity provisions set forth in
section 409.2564(6) of the Florida Statutes, which provides:
The department and its officers, employees, and agents and all per-
sons and agencies acting pursuant to contract with the department
are immune from liability in tort for actions taken to establish, en-
force, or modify support obligations if such actions are taken in
good faith, with apparent legal authority, without malicious pur-
pose, and in a manner not exhibiting wanton and willful disregard
of rights or property of another.
508
Donna Hand represented herself in the proceeding against her former
attorneys.5 9 She informed the trial judge that she was unable to amend her
complaint to avoid statutory immunity.5 0 This fact undoubtedly influenced
both the trial judge and appellate court in not allowing the complaint to be
further amended.
A Dade County School Board employee was denied the opportunity to
sue her attorney who represented her on behalf of the United Teachers of
Dade in an administrative dismissal proceeding in Stafford v. Meek.5 1 The
Stafford court cited to DeGrio v. American Federation of Government
Employees1 2 for the following proposition that "attorneys may not be held
individually liable for their malpractice in representing union members
where the union provides the attorneys' services as part of its duty of fair
representation to an employee in a grievance or termination proceeding. 51 3
Although the Stafford court acknowledged that the DeGrio court's language
was dicta, it provided the weight of persuasive authority in affirming a final
judgment in favor of the attorney. 514
The public defender has not escaped liability for malpractice under the
doctrine of judicial immunity. As stated in Windsor v. Gibson:515
Considerations which require that a judge and prosecutor be im-
mune from liability for the exercise of duties essential to the ad-
ministration of justice, do not require that the same immunity be
508. FLA. STAT. § 409.2564(6) (1995).
509. Hand, 718 So, 2d at 235.
510. Id.
511. 762 So. 2d 925 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
512. 484 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1986).
513. Stafford, 762 So. 2d at 926.
514. Id.
515. 424 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
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extended to the public defender. While the prosecutor is an officer
of the state whose duty it is to see that impartial justice is done, the
public defender is an advocate, who once appointed owes a duty
only to his client, the indigent defendant. His role does not differ
from that of privately retained counsel. 516
The Third District Court of Appeal, in Wilcox v. Brummer,51 7 quoted the
above language from Windsor and also held that the public defender's
exposure for malpractice is equal to that of private counsel. Both of the
courts' certified questions to the Supreme Court of Florida, concerning
whether a public defender is shielded from liability due to judicial immunity,
went unanswered.
XI. DAMAGES
A. Attorneys' Fees
In Florida, absent a contractual or statutory basis, attorneys' fees are not
compensable.518 However, if a client sues a third party to recover a portion
of the damages caused by the negligent attorney, the attorney's fees incurred
in suing the third party may be recovered pursuant to the Wrongful Act
Doctrine,51 9 which provides as follows:
One who through the tort of another has been required to act in the
protection of his interests by bringing or defending an action
against a third person is entitled to recover reasonable compensa-
tion for loss of time, attorney's fees and other expenditures thereby
suffered or incurred in the earlier action. 2°
The client in De Pantosa Saenz v. Rigau & Rigau, P.A. 52' alleged that
without her authorization, her attorney filled in a blank deed that she signed
at his request with the name of his mother-in-law in return for the mother-in-
516. d. at 889.
517. 739 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
518. See generally Florida Patient's Comp. Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145, 1148 (Fla.
1985).
519. See State Farm v. Pritcher, 546 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (stating
an attorney is not entitled to fees under the "wrongful act doctrine" against third party after
client dismissed malpractice action).
520. RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS § 914(2) (1977).
521. 549 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
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law's assumption of a mortgage. 522 The mother-in-law agreed to rescind the
transaction after reimbursement of her investment in the property.523 The
Second District permitted a claim for attorney's fees in the malpractice suit
for the attorney's fees incurred in the litigation against the mother-in-law.524
"Typically, a plaintiff has the right to recover attorneys' fees incurred in
litigation with a third party, as an element of compensatory damages, if that
litigation was caused by the defendant's breach of contract or wrongful
act.
, 525
In Espinosa v. Sparber, Shevin, Shapo, Rosen & Heilbronner, 6 the
court dismissed the complaint with prejudice for failure (and inability) to
plead the necessary privity requirement. The Third District Court of Appeal
affirmed, stating that the pretermitted heir could not maintain the malprac-
tice action; however, the court reversed as to the Estate.527 The appellate
court held that the law firm was responsible to the Estate for the costs of
defending the pretermitted heir's lawsuit holding that:
Clearly, the testator's estate should be entitled to a return of the at-
torney's fee paid by the testator to the lawyer, as well as any costs
and fees incurred in defending the estate against any action gener-
ated by the lawyer's negligence, such as an action brought by the
omitted beneficiary to receive a share of the estate.528
B. Prejudgment Interest
A malpractice plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest from the date
of loss. Since the amount of damages was disputed and there was no date
certain upon which such damages were owed, the First District Court of
Appeal upheld a trial court ruling denying prejudgment interest in Chadwick529
v. Corbin. The requirements for prejudgment interest were satisfied in
deManio v. Burns.53 ° "[Wihen a verdict liquidates damages on a plaintiffs
out-of-pocket, pecuniary losses, [the] plaintiff is entitled, as a matter of law,
522. Id. at 685.
523. Id.
524. Id.
525. De Pantosa Saenz, 549 So. 2d at 685.
526. 586 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991), approved by Espinosa v. Sparber,
Shevin, 612 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. 1993).
527. Espinosa, 586 So. 2d at 1224-25.
528. Id. at 1223-24 (citations omitted).
529. 476 So. 2d 1366, 1368-69 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
530. 642 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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to prejudgment interest at the statutory rate from the date of that lOSS. ' ' 53"
The verdict in deManio awarded pecuniary losses as of a certain date.532
Therefore, the court awarded prejudgment interest. 533  The court also
awarded prejudgment interest in Fisher v. Ackerman534 and Tarleton v.
Arnstein & Lehr,535 since the jury awards had the effect of liquidating
damages as of a certain date.
C. Punitive Damages
An attorney who gives improper or erroneous advice to a client who
suffers damage as a result may be subject to a malpractice action for
compensatory damages. However, such negligence, if it exists, and even if
gross, does not warrant an award of punitive damages absent the necessary
allegations and proof of wantonness or reckless indifference.536 The fact
that an attorney who allegedly gave bad advice had listed his name with a
lawyer referral service as being proficient in that particular field of law, by
itself, does not rise to the level of wantonness or reckless indifference
required for punitive damages. 537 Similarly, an attorney's failure to file a
security interest with the Secretary of State was not sufficient to warrant
punitive damages in Chadwick v. Corbin.
53s
Another Florida case involving legal malpractice and punitive damages
is De Pantosa Saenz v. Rigau & Rigau, P.A.539 The former client sought
punitive damages, alleging fraud in the sale of certain real estate.54° The
Court stated, "[mioreover, the plaintiff seeks punitive damages against Mr.
Rigau. Assuming the plaintiff can establish facts warranting punitive
531. Id. (citing Argonaut Ins. Co. v. May Plumbing Co., 474 So. 2d 212,- 215 (Fla.
1985)).
532. deManio, 642 So. 2d at 807.
533. See also Gomez v. Hawkins Concrete Constr. Co., 623 F. Supp. 194 (N.D. Fla.
1985).
534. 744 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
535. 719 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
536. De Pantosa Saenz v. Rigau & Rigau, P.A., 549 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1989); Solodky v. Wilson, 474 So. 2d 1231, 1233 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985); see also
DeToro v. Dervan Investments Ltd. Corp., 483 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(allowing evidence of punitive damages to be introduced against an attorney in a breach of
fiduciary duty lawsuit).
537. Solodky, 474 So. 2d at 1232.
538. 476 So. 2d 1366, 1367-68 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
539. 549 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
540. Id. at 684.
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damages, the previously received remedy of rescission would not bar an
additional award of punitive damages. 54'
Punitive damages were awarded against the attorneys in Stinson v.
Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. The Court found that the trial
judge properly awarded punitive damages since the lawyers' behavior was
"egregious," "self-serving," and "unconscionable.3 The attorney's conduct
in Medel v. Republic National Bank of Miami544 was determined to be an
issue for trial rather than summary judgment.
Applying Florida law, federal courts have also found punitive damages
against attorneys to be warranted . 5 Florida law is clear: under appropriate
circumstances punitive damages can be awarded against an attorney in a
malpractice proceeding.
XII. ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Communications between attorneys and their clients are generally
protected from discovery. 4  However, there are at least three exceptions to
the attorney-client privilege that are relevant to a malpractice action: (1) the
defense exception, (2) the common interest exception, and (3) the fraud
exception. The defense exception to the attorney-client privilege found in
section 90.502(4)(c) of the Florida Statutes, provides "[t]here is no lawyer-
client privilege under this section when... [a] communication is relevant to
an issue of breach of duty by the lawyer to the client or by the client to the
lawyer, arising from the lawyer-client relationship.7
541. Id. at 685.
542. 416 So. 2d 1183, 1185 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
543. Id.
544. 365 So. 2d 782, 784-85 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
545. See, e.g., Singleton v. Foreman, 435 F.2d 962, 971 (5th Cir. 1970) (holding "that
Foreman's alleged conduct was sufficient to state an independent tort action, and, since that
alleged conduct was both oppressive and showed such a great indifference to the persons and
property rights of others, malice may be imputed, thus justifying punitive damages"); Gay v.
McCaughan, 272 F.2d 160, 162 (5th Cir. 1959) (holding that the action of the attorney would
form the basis on which a jury could award punitive damages).
546. Documents not related to any pending claim, defense, or that are not reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, as in all litigation, are also
protected. See Richard Mulholland & Assocs. v. Polverari, 698 So. 2d 1269, 1270 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
547. FLA. STAT. § 90.502 (4)(c) (2001).
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Exceptions to the attorney-client privilege have been interpreted very
narrowly.548  The case of Shafnaker v. Clayton549 is particularly illustra-
tive.55 ° In Shafnaker, the clients claimed the second law firm, which
represented them in a case involving a lawsuit against Orkin for negligent
application of hazardous chemicals, committed malpractice. 55' The
defendant law firm in the malpractice proceeding sought production of
552documents from the first law firm that had represented the clients. The
court held that the documents maintained by the first law firm were not
discoverable. 553  The law firm in Shafnaker claimed that the privileged
information was vital to their defense. The First District Court of Appeal
was not impressed with this argument and stated that the "mere possibility
that petitioners may not have been fully candid with respondents does not
constitute a waiver of attorney-client privilege with other attorneys. 555
However, if a party has introduced issues in the litigation that go to the very
heart of the litigation, discovery cannot be avoided because of the attorney-
client privilege.
548. Courville v. Promedco of S.W. Fla., Inc., 743 So. 2d 41, 42-43 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1999) (waiving the attorney-client privilege is limited to communications on the same
matter); see also Reed v. State, 640 So. 2d 1094, 1097-98 (Fla. 1994) (waiving privilege only
as to matters specifically at issue in court action); Del Prado v. Robert K. Estes, P.A., 532 So.
2d 1101, 1101 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (lacking any basis to claim privilege as to
requested documents for matter allegedly mishandled); Procacci v. Seitlin, 497 So. 2d 969,
969-70 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (finding that exception applies only to a particular
transaction which resulted in malpractice and not to any other aspect of the attorney-client
relationship).
549. 680 So. 2d 1109, 1110-11 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
550. See also Adelman v. Adelman, 561 So. 2d 671, 673 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990)
(holding that an ex-lawyer may only reveal confidential information necessary to defend
against malpractice claim).
551. Shafnaker, 680 So. 2d at 1110.
552. Id.
553. Id.
554. Id.
555. Id. at 1111 (citing Cuillo v. Cuillo, 621 So. 2d 460, 462 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1993)) (holding that the occurrence of privileged communications regarding a specific
transaction, which is later litigated, does not eliminate the privilege, even if there is a
possibility that the credibility of a party could be impeached by such communications); Long
v. Murphy, 663 So. 2d 1370, 1372 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that proof of
privileged communications to dispute reasonable reliance may well be relevant to the defense,
but that alone does not waive the privilege).
556. First S. Baptist of Mandarin, Fla., Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 610 So. 2d 452, 454
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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The Shafnaker decision was cited with approval in both Coyne v.
Schwartz, Gold, Cohen, Zakarin & Kotler, P.A. and Volpe v. Conroy,
Simberg & Ganon, P.A. 58 In both cases, decided less than one month apart,
certiorari review was sought of trial court orders seeking production of
communications between the plaintiffs and attorneys who were not
defendants in the malpractice proceeding.559 The defendant lawyers' claim
that communications with other lawyers were critical to the defense of the
plaintiffs' allegations did not override the attorney-client privilege. 560 "The
attorney-client privilege cannot be set aside simply because the opposing
party claims that the information held by the attorney is necessary to prove
the opposing party's case."56'
Interestingly, the clients obtained different relief in Volpe and Coyne.
In Coyne, the court remanded the case with instructions for the trial court to
hold an in camera inspection to determine the applicability of the privi-
562 563lege. The Volpe court merely quashed the trial court's order. The relief
afforded in Volpe seems more logical and promotes closure on the issue.
The Second District Court of Appeal in Barnett Banks Trust Co. v.
Compson564 was required to answer the question of "whether a trust
beneficiary who litigates a position adverse to the trust may obtain from the
trustee materials ordinarily protected by the attorney-client privilege and
work product doctrine. 565 The court responded negatively to the inquiry.56
The court found that the attorney-client privilege is paramount to section
737.303(3) of the Florida Statutes, which requires a trustee to provide any
vested beneficiary with relevant information about the assets of a trust
567
relating to administration. 56
The attorney in Ferrari v. Vining wanted to take the deposition in the
malpractice lawsuit of the prior counsel in the underlying action. 569  The
557. 715 So. 2d 1021, 1023 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
558. 720 So. 2d 537, 539 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
559. Coyne, 715 So. 2d at 1021; Volpe, 720 So. 2d at 538.
560. Id.
561. Volpe, 720 So. 2d at 539-40.
562. Coyne, 715 So. 2d at 1023.
563. Volpe, 720 So. 2d at 540.
564. 629 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
565. Id. at 849.
566. Id.
567. Id. at 851.
568. 744 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
569. Id. at 480-81.
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trial court allowed the discovery.570 In overturning the trial court's decision,
the Third District Court of Appeal cited to Adelman v. Adelman,57' and
stated:
Adelman supports the proposition that the attorney-client privilege
between Ferrari and Vining as to what they discussed pertinent to
the issue of Vining's alleged malpractice could be reached. That
does not mean the court could order the deposition and violation of
attorney-client privilege as to other counsel with whom Ferrari dis-
cussed Vining's performance.
572
The court in Ferrari went on to limit the client's waiver of the attorney-
client privilege to "confidential information relating to his representation
only to the extent necessary to defend himself.5 73 Therefore, an attorney
cannot disclose everything about the attorney-client relationship; he may
only respond to specific allegations.574
The common interest exception to the attorney-client privilege found in
section 90.502(4)(e) of the Florida Statutes reads as follows:
A communication is relevant to a matter of common interest be-
tween two or more clients, or their successors in interest, if the
communication was made by any of them to a lawyer retained or
consulted in common when offered in a civil action between the
clients or their successors in interest.
575
This "common interest exception" was examined in Cone v. Culver-
576house. The court held that the prism through which this exception must be
examined is "from the perspective of an objectively reasonable client, not
from a particular client's subjective expectations or from the attorney's
perspective. ' 5 " The client who sued her attorneys for negligence and
intentional infliction of emotional distress in Richard Mulholland and
Associates v. Polverari57s requested production of every "'authority to
represent"' agreement between the law firm and its clients for a five-year
570. Id. at 481.
571. 561 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
572. Ferrari, 744 So. 2d at 481-82.
573. Id. at 482.
574. See id. at 481-82.
575. FLA. STAT. § 90.502(4)(e) (2001).
576. 687 So. 2d 888, 891 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
577. Id. at 892.
578. 698 So. 2d 1269 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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period. 579 The court issued a protective order in favor of the law firm since
the "representation agreements between... [the attorneys] and their other
clients are not related to any pending claim or defense, nor was the
information shown to be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.580
Finally, the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege was at
issue in State v. Marks.58' The court indicated that "the 'crime fraud'
exception to the attorney-client privilege is simply a shorthand expression
recognizing that the privilege may not be used to protect communications
with a lawyer for the purpose of receiving advice for the commission of a
future criminal fraud. 5 a  Once the privilege is asserted, "the state must
make an evidentiary showing plausibly implicating the possible application
of the exception." 5 3 The "party invoking [the] privilege has absolute right
to be heard by testimony and argument.",5  The criminal charges against the
attorneys in the case were dismissed because of ex parte communications
585between the prosecutor and the judge.
XIII. ACTION NOT ASSIGNABLE
A legal malpractice action is not assignable. The assignability of a
legal malpractice action in Florida was first raised in Washington v.
Fireman's Fund Insurance Co.586 The Washington court as a matter of
public policy agreed with the "majority of jurisdictions [which] prohibit the
assignment of such actions because of the personal nature of legal services
which involve highly confidential relationships. 5 87 .The Washington case
was cited with approval, but little discussion, in Mickler v. Aaron588 and
589Kozich v. Shahady. The Supreme Court of Florida delved into the
reasoning behind the prohibition of assigning a cause of action for legal
malpractice in responding to a certified question regarding the assignability
579. Id. at 1270.
580. Id.
581. 758 So. 2d 1131, 1132 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
582. Marks, 758 So. 2d at 1133 n.2 (citing United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 565
(1989)).
583. Id. at 1134.
584. Id.
585. Id. at 1133.
586. 459 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
587. Id. at 1149.
588. 490 So. 2d 1343 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
589. 702 So. 2d 1289 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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of a cause of action against an insurance agent in Forgione v. Dennis Pirtle
Agency, Inc.:590
As an Illinois appellate court noted in Christison v. Jones, 83
Ill.App.3d 334, 39 Ill. Dec. 560, 562, 405 N.E.2d 8, 10 (1980), the
duty breached in legal malpractice arises out of a contract for legal
services and the resulting injuries are pecuniary injuries to intangi-
ble property interests, rather than personal injuries in the strict
sense of injuries to the body, feelings, or character of the client.
While these aspects might indicate that legal malpractice falls
within the class of actions that are assignable, the Illinois court
concluded that legal malpractice is not subject to assignment be-
cause "the real basis and substance of the malpractice suit" is a
breach of the duties within the personal relationship between the
attorney and client. Id. Thus, it is "the unique quality of legal ser-
vices, the personal nature of the attorney's duty to the client[,] and
the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship" that have led
other courts to conclude that legal malpractice claims are not sub-
ject to assignment. Goodley v. Wank & Wank, Inc., 62 Cal. App. 3d
389, 133 Cal.Rptr. 83, 87 (1976).591
The next opportunity to review the assignability doctrine was presented
in National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Salter.592 Using a subrogation
theory in its malpractice action, National Union sued the attorneys who had
represented one of its insureds. The dismissal of the case was affirmed upon
a holding that the same analysis that prohibited the assignment of a legal
malpractice claim also prohibited "the subrogation of a debtor's legal
malpractice claim., 593 The fact that the actual client was not a party to the
lawsuit was critical to the court's holding which noted that the client "may
not even be interested or believe that it has a legal malpractice action against
its attorneys," and the attorneys might need to reveal the "work product" and
"confidences" of its client in order to properly defend its position.
After acknowledging that a cause of action for legal malpractice is not
assignable under Florida law, the court in Northcutt v. BankAtlantic
595
discussed whether or not a bankruptcy trustee could assign a legal
590. 701 So. 2d 557, 559 (Fla. 1997).
591. Id.
592. 717 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
593. Id. at 143.
594. Id.
595. 767 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
[Vol. 27:85
68
Nova Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 5
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol27/iss1/5
Trazenfeld
596
malpractice claim. Without deciding the issue, the court cited to several
cases from other jurisdictions,597 suggesting that a tort action that arose
598during a bankruptcy proceeding could not be sold or assigned. Northcutt
went on to argue that if the assignment was void, the trustee had abandoned
the claim and the claim then reverted to Northcutt.599 The summary
judgment, which held that certain proceeds of a legal malpractice claim
could be garnished, was reversed due to a finding that there were issues of
material fact.60°
Northcutt was also involved in Northcutt v. Bryan,60 1 in which he
argued that the sale of his legal malpractice claim by the trustee appointed in
his bankruptcy case to the attorney he had sued was void because such a
claim was not assignable.60 2 Although the court held that Northcutt "may
well be correct on his theory that, because legal malpractice claims are not
assignable under Florida law, a bankruptcy trustee cannot assign a clam,0
since the bankruptcy order approving the sale was not appealed, he did not
have standing to bring his legal malpractice claim.605
XIV. EXPERT TESTIMONY
A trial court erred in determining that an affidavit as to breach of duty
or causation was sufficient to shift the burden of proof in a summary
judgment hearing to the client, notwithstanding the lack of any contrary
affidavit in Heitmeyer v. Sasser.6  The conclusory nature of the affidavit
was the underlying basis of the court's ruling. This ruling is in direct
contrast to Manner v. Goldstein Professional Ass'n,6°7 in which a summary
596. Id. at 564.
597. Id. See also Integrated Solutions, Inc. v. Serv. Support Specialties, Inc., 124 F.3d
487 (3d Cir. 1997); In re J.E. Marion, Inc., 199 B.R. 635 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1996); Baum v.
Duckor, Spradling & Metzger, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703 (C. Ct. App. 1999).
598. Northcutt, 767 So. 2d at 564.
599. Id. (citing to In re Bennett, 13 B.R. 643 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1981)).
600. Northcutt, 767 So. 2d at 565.
601. 775 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
602. Id. at 977.
603. Id.
604. Id.
605. Id. at 978.
606. 664 So. 2d 358 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
607. 436 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983). See also Dadic v. Schneider, 722
So. 2d 921 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (withholding comment as to the propriety of both
sides filing affidavits).
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judgment in favor of an attorney was upheld due to "an unrebutted affidavit
by a prominent member of the bar of this state on file stating that the action
of her counsel ...did not depart from the expected degree and care of
conduct of counsel for a mother of [sic, in] a domestic relation [sic]
matter.' '6 8 Under any circumstances, the court cannot review affidavits and
make a credibility judgment in a summary judgment context. 9 6
The case of Willage v. Law Offices of Wallace and Breslow, P.A.,6 1°
held that legal malpractice can not be inferred merely because of a
defendant's verdict in a slip and fall case.61' "Without expert testimony, a
lay jury could only speculate as to whether an attorney's conscious decision
not to call a purported witness constituted negligence, where in the
attorney's opinion, the witness on cross examination could have given
testimony damaging to plaintiff's case.",6 12 The plaintiff in Warwick, Paul &• 613
Warwick v. Dotter, sued his divorce lawyer for failure to attend a divorce
614trial on behalf of the husband. The attorney for the wife was called as an
expert in the malpractice proceeding and asked a "hypothetical question to
prove the possibility that a more financially favorable divorce decree could
have been obtained had not the firm been negligent.16 5 The court found
such testimony sufficient to establish the appropriate standard of care and
pointed out that with the exception of the chancellor, the wife's attorney was
"the most informed available person as to the facts and law involved in the
divorce case."616
Certain kinds of malpractice may be so apparent that expert testimony
is not mandatory. The client suffered a dismissal of his suit in Suritz v.
617Kelner, due to his attorney's failure to tell his client to respond to
interrogatories. 6 18 "In the instant case, if the jury finds the facts to be as
608. Manner, 436 So. 2d at 432.
609. Sierra v. Shevin, 767 So. 2d 524, 525 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (citations
omitted).
610. 415 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
611. Id. at 768.
612. Id. (citations omitted).
613. 190 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
614. Id.
615. Id. at 597.
616. Id. at 598.
617. 155 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
618. Id. at 832.
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presented by the plaintiff, the negligence of the attorney may appear from
these facts without the need of expert testimony.''619
Galloway v. Law Offices of Merkle, Bright and Sullivan, P.A.,620
involves both an affidavit and the need for expert testimony. 62' A summary
judgment in favor of the attorney was obtained based upon the attorney's
622
unrebutted affidavit. Such affidavit "merely stated that appellant's file
was handled in accordance with the community standard of care, but the
affidavit nowhere attempts to explain why this case was not filed within the
• • .,623
statute of limitations as alleged in the complaint."2 The summary judgment
was reversed upon a finding that a counter affidavit was not necessary.624
The court went on to state, "[w]e think the unexplained failure to file within
a statute of limitations as described in this complaint is such an apparent
breach of a duty of care as to obviate the need for expert testimony from
appellant on a motion for summary judgment. ',625
XV. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Florida Standard Jury Instruction 4.2(c) can be used in an attorney
626
malpractice case. Since all attorney malpractice proceedings involve a
"case within a case," the jury instructions often reflect the cause of action
from the underlying case. The plaintiffs theory against the lawyer in
Cunningham v. Koon,627 was that he drafted a note that was usurious.628 A
deficient jury instruction on usury resulted in the reversal of the verdict in
favor of the client.
629
630In Spaziano v. Price, the court discussed the distinction in jury
instructions between negligence and liability.631 Florida Standard Jury
619. Id. at 834. Without indicating the extent of expert testimony in the trial court, the
appellate court in Spaziano v. Price found the attorneys' conduct "clearly fell below a
reasonable standard of care." 763 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
620. 596 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
621. Id. at 1206.
622. Id.
623. Id. at 1207.
624. Id.
625. Galloway, 596 So. 2d at 1207.
626. See FLA. STD JURY INSTR. IN CIVIL CASES § 4.2(c) (1967) (amended 2001).
627. 762 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
628. Id.
629. Id.
630. 763 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
631. Id. at 1050.
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Instruction (Civil) 3.1 (c) and 3.6(c) are to be used when negligence has been
determined either by admission or a directed verdict.632  This set of
instructions leaves open the question of whether the attorney's acts were the
cause of the injury. Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Civil) 3.1(d) applies
when there is a directed verdict on liability and only requires the jury to
633determine the amount of damages.
XVI. CONCLUSION
In Florida, a plaintiff in a legal malpractice action must prove that he is
in privity with the attorney or the third-party beneficiary to the attorney's
work, that the attorney neglected a reasonable duty, and that the attorney's
negligence proximately caused the plaintiff's loss. Further, the plaintiff may
have to prove that the judgment in the underlying transaction was collectible.
An attorney may be absolved of liability by the involvement of a subsequent
attorney, and the attorney's loss may be spread between or among others
sharing in the representation. Proving malpractice in criminal defense means
proving different elements and perhaps a higher standard of proof than in
transactional and civil litigational malpractice. Generally, the malpractice
plaintiff will need expert testimony to make his case. The malpractice
plaintiff may not assign his cause of action. The successful plaintiff is
entitled to compensatory fees and prejudgment interest; however, punitive
damages are limited in their availability.
The attorney defendant may affirmatively defend using various estoppel
defenses, comparative negligence, in pari delicto and fraud, statute of
limitations, and abandonment. Under some circumstances, the attorney may
affirmatively defend that the underlying judgment was not collectible. In
certain limited circumstances, the attorney may be immune to suit. Although
defense of a malpractice suit is a situation that allows invasion of the
attorney-client privilege, the invasion is not an unlimited one.
Revisiting Sir Thomas More's thoughts in A Man for All Seasons, "The
law is not a 'light' for you or any man to see by; the law is not an instrument
of any kind. The law is a causeway upon which so long as he keeps to it a
citizen may walk safely. 634 As with any other "citizen," the law provides an
attorney a causeway. If the attorney keeps to the causeway, he avoids
professional liability and legal malpractice.
632. Id.
633. Id.
634. Bolt, supra note 1.
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